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Abstract
Different governments focus on different parts of the existing World Trade Organization rules
as posing opportunities for their producers to expand trade if the rules were relaxed or eliminated.
While this may be understandable, it is the premise of this Essay that such an approach, if pur-
sued, would result in slower trade liberalization, not increased liberalization, as those segments
of industry perceiving that the existing equilibrium is not to their advantage are given no options
other than to oppose further liberalization. When, as in agriculture, domestic politics can threaten
the survival of governments, liberalization without strong rules can only be slow liberalization.
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INTRODUCTION
The multilateral trading system is highly successful in ex-
panding market opportunities for many sectors within agricul-
ture and manufacturing because it recognizes the need for inter-
nationally-agreed upon rules that permit countries to address
problems in an agreed-upon manner as markets are opened.
Historically, the question has not been whether countries will
agree to expand trade opportunities in an environment without
rules. Few, if any, countries would consider such an approach
desirable or workable. Rather, the issue has been what rules are
needed for countries to have the confidence to liberalize their
economies, particularly import sensitive sectors, so as to achieve
overall benefits. "Most Favored Nation" (or "MFN") and "Na-
tional Treatment" are two important principles/rules that give
trading nations the confidence that trade will not be discrimina-
tory. Rules on government subsidies and on injurious dumping
have given countries assurance that their producers will win or
lose on the basis of underlying competitive strength, not based
on the deep pocket of a treasury or the artificial price signals
created by dumping. Similarly, countries have been able to tell
their producers and workers that should liberalization result in
serious dislocations, temporary relief would be available to re-
group or permit an orderly retreat from the market under Arti-
cle XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(or "GATT") and the Agreement on Safeguards. Indeed, within
the United States, organized labor's historic support for trade
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liberalization was premised upon the availability of such safe-
guard options to prevent massive dislocations. As a result, every
major trade agreement entered into by the United States since
1942 includes a safeguard provision, and the safeguard concept
in U.S. law is found in principles identified in 1934.1
During the Uruguay Round, there were efforts to bring his-
torically sensitive sectors-agriculture and textiles-fully under
the traditional GATT rules. Because of the sensitivities and/or
peculiarities of these sectors, certain transitional provisions were
included to allow countries to address potential politically unac-
ceptable inequalities. Thus, for example, importing countries
agreed to the full integration of textiles and apparel into the
GATT/World Trade Organization 2 (or "WTO") system at the
end of a ten year phase-in period, as long as there were special
transitional safeguard provisions.3 In agriculture, where many
products are perishable and have a short shelf life and others are
deemed to be politically sensitive, special safeguard provisions
were permitted in limited circumstances to give more automatic
adjustment rights.4
Not surprisingly, different governments focus on different
parts of the existing rules as posing opportunities for their pro-
ducers to expand trade if the rules were relaxed or eliminated.
While this may be understandable, it is the premise of this Essay
that such an approach, if pursued, would result in slower trade
liberalization, not increased liberalization, as those segments of
industry perceiving that the existing equilibrium is not to their
1. See Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, §1, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). That statute
planted the seeds of American safeguard policy in stating that the expansion of foreign
trade would serve
[Als a means of assisting in the present emergency in restoring the American
standard of living, in over-coming domestic unemployment and the present
economic depression, increasing the purchasing power of the American pub-
lic, and in establishing and maintaining a better relationship among various
branches of American agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce..
Id.
See also 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 1730-31
(Terence P. Stewart, ed.) (1993) [hereinafter UR TREATISE].
2. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
3. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 6, WTO Agreement,
Annex 1A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/final-e.htm.
4. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 5, WTO Agreement, Annex
1A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/final-e.htm.
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advantage are given no options other than to oppose further lib-
eralization. When, as in agriculture, domestic politics can
threaten the survival of governments, liberalization without
strong rules can only be slow liberalization.
Let us look at a number of areas where rules need to be
revisited, maintained, or added.
Rules That Need to be Revisited: * Safeguards
* Dispute Settlement
Rules That Need to be Maintained: e Anti-dumping
e Subsidies
Rules That Need to be Added: 9 Perishable agriculture
e Structural excess capacity
Rules are the lifeblood of liberalization. As a new round of ne-
gotiations is pursued, hopefully the WTO Members will ensure a
structure of rules that will permit maximum trade liberalization.
I. RULES TO BE REVISITED
A. Safeguard Agreement
Every system needs a safety release valve to handle situations
where too much pressure has been brought to bear on some
part of the system. In the multilateral trading system, the prod-
uct-specific safety release valve has primarily been contained in
Article XIX of the GATT, 5 and, since the Uruguay Round, in the
Agreement on Safeguards.6 There has also been a safety release
valve for countries in toto in exceptional situations-the balance
of payments provision.7 Special provisions have also existed for
developing countries under Article XVIII. s Moreover, some is-
sues have been viewed as too sensitive to be trumped by trade
objectives (Article XX, public health, morals, etc.), at least where
the action at issue is not a disguised trade restraint.
Article XIX of the GATT 1947 provided for "Emergency Ac-
tion on Imports of Particular Products." Paragraph 1 (a) of the
Article provides:
5. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XIX, WrO
Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1,
33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
6. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/finale.htm [hereinafter Agreement on
Safeguards].
7. See GATT 1994 art. XII.
8. See GATT 1994 art. XVIII.
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If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of
the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this
Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being
imported into the territory of that contracting party in such
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory
of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent
and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy
such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or
to withdraw or modify the concession.
9
While the threshold for action was high, the concept was very
much to encourage countries to participate in the liberalization
activity by assuring participants that tools existed to deal with a
crisis in any particular industry affected. As stated in the GATT
Activities 1988 review of the Safeguards negotiations taking place
in the Uruguay Round:
The GATT's draftsmen, in the 1940s, realized that govern-
ments would be unwilling to accept far-reaching obligations
to reduce and stabilize obstacles to trade unless they were al-
lowed certain limited "escapes" from its general principles.
Article XIX is one such "escape clause" and the actions it per-
mits are usually referred to as "safeguards" measures.' 0
Hatters Fur, an early GATT challenge to a U.S. escape clause
action, upheld the U.S. action and suggests that a reasonable
construction of Article XIX is possible by countries implement-
ing the Article that would allow problems to be addressed when
they arise.1
Nonetheless, whether because of the administrative require-
ments that Article XIX suggested or the need for more effective
tools, GATT Contracting Parties took a variety of actions that
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
10. See GATT 1947, GA TT Activities 1988, at 44 (1989).
11. In Hatters Fur, members of the Working Party determined that "unforeseen
developments" should be interpreted to mean developments occurring after the negoti-
ation of the relevant tariff concession. It would not be reasonable to expect that the
negotiators of the country making the concession could and should have foreseen all
possible developments at the time when the concession was negotiated. See Report of the
Intersessional Working Party on the Complaint of Czechoslovakia Concerning the Withdrawal by
the United States of a Tariff Concession under Article XIX of the GATT, GATT/CP/106 (Oct.
22, 1951) [hereinafter Hatters Fur].
2000]
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were not specifically authorized under Article XIX, particularly
in textiles and clothing.1 2 While the textile sector's problems,
identified in the 1950s and 1960s, resulted in the Multifibre Ar-
rangement (or "MFA"), it has taken decades for textiles and
clothing to be fully integrated into the international trading sys-
tem. Indeed, complete integration is not scheduled until the
end of 2004.1'
Similarly, Article XIX of GATT 1947 contains the concept of
a balance of rights and obligations after any action by a Member,
meaning either compensation to trading partners affected by a
safeguard action or the potential for retaliation against exports
for the country taking action.1 4 Since GATT Contracting Parties
were not able to take safeguard actions only against selected
countries, compensation could become prohibitive even though
only one or a few countries were causing market difficulties.
While the concept of a balance of rights makes sense since no
unfair trade practice is alleged, it also made a country's use of
the safeguard right very difficult regardless of the state of extremis
being faced by the domestic industry seeking relief. For many
countries, it became important to find ways to get relief without
having to pursue formal safeguard procedures and remedies. As
explained below, this need resulted in countries turning increas-
ingly to the use of "grey-area" measures.
Approximately 130 Article XIX invocations or notifications
have occurred since 1947. This number is small in compari-
son With the number of relief measures adopted by countries.
When due to political ramifications, the use of Article XIX is
impracticable, Contracting Parties have resorted instead to
the use of "grey-area" measures-measures taken that are not
part of articulated GATT rights and obligations. Grey-area
measures have emerged as an attractive option because coun-
tries can negotiate these types of measures outside of GATT
rules or disciplines (although such actions are arguably chal-
lengeable under Articles XXII and XXIII). One of the other
perceived "advantages" of grey-area measures is the lack of
compensation or retaliation with grey-area measures. Moreo-
ver, grey-area measures may be imposed in fact for extended
12. See GATT Doc. L/1374 (1960), reprinted in GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 106 (1961).
13. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 9, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/final_e.htm.
14. See GATT 1947 art. XIX, para. 3a.
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periods of time. These agreements include Orderly Market-
ing Arrangements ("OMAs"), Voluntary Restraint Agree-
ments ("VRAs"), and other bilateral arrangements. Export
restraint agreements have been used to cover such important
trade areas as automobiles, consumer electronic products,
steel and steel-related products, agricultural products, textiles
and footwear. The legal status of these measures has never
been formally clarified by the Contracting Parties. While at-
tempts have been made since the beginning of the Tokyo
Round in 1973 to specify rules that will cover these measures
in the General Agreement, no rules were in place as of the
end of the Tokyo Round.
Grey-area measures, in numbers exceed the total "escape
clause" actions under Article XIX. According to a 1991
GATT source, as of early 1991, only twenty-four Article XIX
actions were in force. See Table 1 (listing Article XIX actions
in effect as of early 1990). In comparison, 284 grey-area
agreements were known to be in force. See Table 2 (breaking
down grey-area measures by product as of December 1990).
According to GATT sources, approximately forty percent of
these arrangements have been in effect since 1985; and sixty
percent of the existing arrangements have no explicit expira-
tion date. 15
During the Uruguay Round, countries were at last able to
conclude an Agreement on Safeguards.' 6 The Agreement im-
plementing Article XIX of GATT 1994, prohibits "grey-area"
measures, permits limited selectivity in certain circumstances,
encourages adjustment, and reduces the cost of taking safeguard
action by prohibiting retaliation if relief is in place for three
years or less. 7 A good test for the trading system is whether
15. UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1725-26.
16. Under GATT 1947, safeguards were regulated only by Article XIX, and it was
the Uruguay Round that created the SG Agreement, which adds clarity and introduces
certain changes. The SG Agreement was negotiated in large part because GATT Con-
tracting Parties had been increasingly applying a variety of so-called grey area measures
(bilateral voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing agreements, and similar mea-
sures) to limit imports of certain products. These measures were not imposed pursuant
to Article XIX, and thus were not subject to multilateral discipline through the GATT,
and the legality of such measures under the GATT was doubtful. The Agreement now
clearly prohibits such measures, and has specific provisions for eliminating those that
were in place at the time the WTO Agreement entered into force. See World Trade
Organization, Goods: Rules on trade remedies at www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/
eol/e/default.htm (discussing historical background to Agreement on Safeguards).
17. See Agreement on Safeguards art. 9.
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countries are able to address highly disruptive trade surges
within the system now that the WTO and the Agreement on
Safeguards are in operation. If not, the trading system will face
significant reluctance by participants to engage in further trade
liberalization on a multilateral basis, will see the rise of "grey-
area" measures despite their prohibition, or will experience a se-
rious rupture as individual countries are not able to withstand
the trading pressure in politically-sensitive sectors.
In examining pre- and post-WTO safeguard activity, several
facts must be kept in mind. Many developing countries under-
took relatively few tariff bindings prior to the Uruguay Round or
were long-term users of balance-of-payment ("BOP") excep-
tions.18 In contrast, developed countries typically had reduced
most industrial tariffs to very low levels over the various rounds
of trade negotiations. 9 Developed countries also were not users
of BOP exceptions. 20 Because the major developed countries
had historically focused on each other during tariff negotiations,
some developing countries enjoyed tariff liberalization in devel-
oped countries because of the "most-favored-nation" rights/obli-
gations of the GATT without making significant tariff bindings
and tariff reductions in their own country. 21 This "free rider"
situation halted during the Uruguay Round, as developing coun-
try Members of the WTO undertook tariff bindings and reduc-
tion obligations on nearly all industrial and agricultural goods.2 2
Still, some developing countries maintain some tariff flexibility
as tariff bindings (even after reductions) are at levels above ap-
plied rates in 1993, meaning that they could raise tariffs to some
extent on particular products without resorting to Article XIX.
At the same time, countries that were long-term users of balance-
of-payment exceptions were asked to reassume their obligations
or to justify continuation of the BOP measures, with significant
pressure to phase out the temporary restraints. 23 Finally, many
countries that were not Members of GATT prior to the Uruguay
18. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 396.
19. See id., at 385-458.
20. For a discussion on GATT articles XII and XVII (BOP provisions), see id., at
1859-1875.
21. See id., at 386.
22. See generally WTO Agreement vols. 2-26, 28-30, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). These
volumes contain the individual member tariff bindings and reduction obligations.
23. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1874-1875.
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Round joined the WTO. Most of the new Members are develop-
ing countries, so there are significantly more developing country
Members today than there were under the GATT.
Because most industrial tariffs are relatively low in devel-
oped countries, one would expect that safeguard actions in such
nations would flow from large dislocations in demand patterns.
Illustrative examples include the collapse of demand in the for-
mer Soviet Union; financial crisis in Southeast Asia and the re-
sulting contraction in demand in a number of important coun-
tries; severe recessions; and dramatic change in exchange rates.
Similarly, this effect could be the result of liberalization in those
sectors that have historically enjoyed significant tariff and other
protection (e.g., parts of agriculture). Because developing coun-
tries have, on average, much higher levels of tariffs than do de-
veloped countries, one would expect developing countries to be-
come more avid users of the safeguard provisions as tariff bind-
ings expose domestic producers in developing countries to their
first serious challenges from imported goods.
24
From 1947 through 1988, the following nations brought 112
of the over 130 total Article XIX cases brought within the GATT:
Australia (38), United States (27), European Communities (25),
and Canada (22).25 This amounts to three to four actions per
year globally, nearly three of which were from these four major
developed countries or groups of countries. By contrast, the
2000 annual report of the WTO Safeguard Committee (Annex
2) shows the following number of safeguard cases brought under
the WTO since 1995:
24. As shown by the table below, developing countries generally continued to
maintain higher average tariffs even after the Uruguay Round.
Trade-Weighted Average Tariffs for Industrial Goods
Pre-Uruguay Round Post-Uruguay Round
Developed countries 6.3% 3.9%
Developing countries 15.3% 12.3%
Countries in transition 8.6% 6.0%
Source: Schott, Jeffrey J., The Uruguay Round: An Assessment (Institute for
International Economics, 1994) at 61 (Table 7). The above rates for
developing countries are based on bound, not applied, rates. Id.
25. See GATT, GATT AcrIVITIES 1988, at 44 (1989).
2000]
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Developing countries: 35 cases
Countries in transition: 5 cases
Developed countries: 10 cases
26
Thus, developed countries now represent only 20% of safeguard
cases (fewer than two per year) while developing countries now
account for 70% of safeguard activity (six to seven per year).
WTO Members continue to impose "grey-area" measures on
non-WTO Member countries. For example, China's accession
protocol (draft) has an annex on measures currently in effect
that certain WTO Members will phase out over a particular pe-
riod of time 27 and the press has reported that Mexico and China
are negotiating over the phase out of Mexico's coverage of 1400
Harmonized System ("HS") categories of imports under its
dumping law under procedures that would not have been appro-
priate had China been a WTO Member at the time. 2' For WTO
26. The following countries have brought safeguards cases since 1995:
Developing countries: Argentina (3); Brazil (1); Chile (4); Colombia
(1); Ecuador (2); Egypt (3); El Salvador (2);
India (11); Korea (4); Morocco (1); Venezuela
(3).
Countries in transition: Czech Republic (1); Latvia (1); Slovak Republic
(2); Slovenia (1).
Developed countries: Australia (1); United States (9).
See Report (2000) of the Committee on Safeguards, G/L/409 (Nov. 23, 2000) at 8-12.
27. See Working Party on Accession of China, Draft Report of Working Party on
Accession of China to the WTO, WT/ACC/SPEC/CHN/1/Rev. 4 (Oct. 24, 2000); see
also China Provides New Trade Data as Accession Talks Recommence, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept.
15, 2000.
28. In November 2000, Mexico and China met to continue negotiations on the
terms of a bilateral agreement prior to China's accession to the WTO. A primary focus
of discussions was the status of Mexico's existing anti-dumping duty orders applicable to
imports from China. As reported by the Chinese press:
In April 1993, Mexico carried out anti-dumping investigations on thousands of
products exported from China and levied duties on them ranging between 16
and 1,105 per cent of the actual value of the product. So far, more than 1,000
products are still on the Mexican anti-dumping list, according to Long, noting
that this goes against the basic principles of the WTO.
The Mexican side said it needed a transitional period to smooth away the diffi-
culties facing its domestic businesses.
In consideration of this, China has agreed that Mexico's anti-dumping ar-
rangement, which violates WTO rules, can be phased out gradually, Long said.
Mexico Not Likely to Hinder WTO Bid, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 11, 2000, at
www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndydb/2000/1 ldl-lwto.bl8.html.
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Members, however, the Safeguards Agreement required that all
"4grey-area" measures be eliminated or brought into conformity
with the Agreement' by the end of 1998, with Members afforded
an opportunity to select one measure that could be maintained
until the end of 1999.29 Only the European Community ("EC")
exercised the latter option, maintaining restraints on Japanese
automobiles that expired at the end of 1999.0
The increased use of the Agreement on Safeguards by devel-
oping countries (and others) is a positive development. It is sim-
ply not realistic to assume that trade liberalization can go on at a
significant pace without some significant dislocations and the oc-
casional need for regrouping in particular sectors. The activity
level for 140 nations (nine to ten cases per year) is almost cer-
tainly too low if other restraints are not being used by countries.
It is unclear whether the relatively low usage rate is due to (a)
difficulties for most Member nations in implementing their
rights and complying with their obligations, (b) constructions of
WTO rights and obligations by WTO panels and the Appellate
Body, or (c) other reasons. What is certain is that the direction
taken by the panels and Appellate Body, to date, is discouraging
use of Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards. The result
will be predictable-a slowdown in liberalization efforts within
the multilateral context (already seen in the slowness of progress
towards a new Round within the WTO) and/or a search for new
bilateral solutions outside of the system.
It is not the function of this Essay to review in depth the
decisions of individual panels or the Appellate Body. Whether
the constructions of the panels and the Appellate Body have
29. See Agreement on Safeguards art. 11.2.
30. See Agreement on Safeguards art. 11.2. As noted by the WTO Secretariat:
Article XIX safeguard measures in effect when the WTO Agreement came into
force must end not later than eight years after they were first applied, or by the
end of 1999, whichever is later. Grey area measures in existence when the
WTO came into force must be brought into conformity with the Agreement
on Safeguards, or removed according to a notified timetable, ending not later
than 31 December 1998. Each member was given the right to maintain a sin-
gle notified measure for one year longer, to 31 December 1999. For the Euro-
pean Communities, the measure concerned was specified in an annex to the
agreement, and consists of restrictions on imports of Japanese cars and light
commercial vehicles. That is, and will remain, the sole example of this excep-
tion, as no other member exercised its right to nominate a similar measure
within the time limit of 90 days after the entry into force of the WTO.
WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 109 (1999).
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been correct or not, the four panel decisions and three Appel-
late Body decisions make the Safeguard provisions harder to use
and hence less likely to be used. Indeed, all of the panel pro-
ceedings that have gone to report and all of the Appellate Body
decisions have found each safeguard action reviewed to violate
some WTO obligations. 1
Despite the fact that most GATT, and now WTO, Members
viewed the "unforeseen developments" provision of Article XIX
of GATT 1947 and GATT 1994 to have been a dead letter for a
number of decades and to have been carefully avoided in the
Agreement on Safeguards, the Appellate Body has breathed life
back into the concept by requiring governments to make a find-
ing on the matter. Since no subsequent decision has defined the
parameters of what can be found to be an "unforeseen develop-
ment," it is unclear whether this issue alone will make the Agree-
ment on Safeguard largely unusable. Certainly, for developing
31. The following are the safeguard panel reports and AB decisions that have been
issued:
Appellate Body
Case Panel Report Report
Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on WT/DS98/R WT/DS98/AB/R
Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98 (June 21, 1999) (Dec. 14, 1999)
Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of WT/DS121/R WT/DS121/AB/R
Footwear, WT/DS121 (June 25, 1999) (Dec. 14, 1999)
United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures WT/DS166/R WT/DS166/AB/R
on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the EC, WT/ (July 31, 2000) (Dec. 22, 2000)
DS166
United States-Safeguard Measure on Imports of WT/DS177/R
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb from New WT/DS178/R
Zealand, WT/DS177 and United States- (Dec. 21, 2000)
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Lamb Meat
from Australia, WT/DS178
A number of other cases have been initiated although some have been abandoned as
safeguard actions have terminated or have not been pursued (excluding transitional
safeguard cases under the Textiles Agreement):
" United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon
Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202.
" Chile-Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural
Products from Argentina, WT/DS207.
" Hungary-Safeguard Measure on Imports of Steel Products from the Czech Republic,
WT/DS159.
" United States-Safeguard Measure Against Imports of Broom Corm Brooms from Co-
lombia, WT/DS78.
• Colombia-Safeguard Measure on Import of Plain Polyester Filaments from Thai-
land, WT/DS181.
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countries, it will be hard to argue that trade expansion is not
foreseeable at the time of negotiations when they move from
high tariffs to significantly lower tariffs. The message for devel-
oping countries, if the panels and Appellate Body place signifi-
cant emphasis on this aspect of safeguard actions, will be to hold
off on further trade liberalization moves or to seek other tools to
address the problems particular sectors face.
The concern that should exist within the WTO is that collec-
tively the positions taken by those challenging safeguard actions
seek a construction of the Agreement that would make it an ex-
traordinary event that any country could ever bring a safeguard
action. If the complainants are successful in their efforts, they
will have effectively sealed the system off from effective pressure
release in particular sectors. They will collectively share the re-
sponsibility for slowing the pace of trade liberalization or for en-
couraging the misuse of other provisions (e.g., SPS measures,
standards, etc.).
Actions needed by the WTO include a reopening of the
Safeguards Agreement to clarify the requirements so as to be
sure that the Agreement can be used exactly when it should be
available. This may require a clarification that "unforeseen de-
velopments" are not required going forward or a set of examples
of what would constitute unforeseen developments that would
make the concept workable for the types of situations likely to
arise. Emergency action should be available when needed. Cre-
ating artificially onerous burdens to the use of safeguard mea-
sures will disserve the trading system, not promote it. Consider
the experience of the United States at the time of adoption of
the current U.S. safeguard law in 1974:
From 1951 through 1962 the escape clause worked reasona-
bly well. The criteria were fair and equitable, and relief was
occasionally granted. However, in 1962 the Administration
proposed and the Congress adopted rigid and stringent tests
of injury and causal relationships between tariff concessions,
increased imports and serious injury.
As a result, the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
for invoking the escape clause (like the adjustment assistance
provisions also adopted in that Act, which contained similar
injury tests) have proven to be an inadequate mechanism for
providing relief to domestic industries injured by import
competition. One result of this inadequacy has been a num-
20001
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ber of special "voluntary" agreements for industries deemed
by the Congress or the Executive to be suffering from exces-
sive imports. The Committee believes it is better to provide a
fair and reasonable test for any industry which is being in-
jured by imports-a determination made by an independent
factfinding body, such as the International Trade Commis-
sion-than to rely on ad hoc agreements for a few select in-
dustries .32
Similarly, Members of the WTO must be concerned that the
construction of what is required in an investigation and in a pub-
lished report of the investigation is manageable by all Members.
A review of panel reports often suggests a requirement of detail
in investigation reports that may be unreasonable to expect all
Members to be able to satisfy. For example, in Korea-Definitive
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products33 ("Korea-
Dairy"), the Appellate Body determined that for Members to
meet their notification requirements in safeguard cases, they
must, at a minimum, address all items listed in Article 12.2 and
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.34 Thus, under Arti-
32. Senate Report No. 93-1298, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 119 (1974). Labor groups in
the United States have traditionally supported trade liberalization as long as adequate
and effective safeguards remain in place to address emergency situations. For example,
in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee considering the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, stated:
As its name implies this bill proposes to increase the volume of America's for-
eign trade. We endorse that objective. We endorse it because this increased
trade will strengthen the unity of the free world and promote the cause of
democracy in the newly established or less developed nations in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America.
We also endorse it because increased trade will stimulate the economic growth
of the United States-if the safeguards provided in the bill are retained ....
[W]e, in the AFL-CIO have consistently supported the various extensions of
the Reciprocal Trade Act over the last 28 years....
We must be clear eyed in facing the problem of imports.... We could talk for
days about the broad, general benefits of foreign trade; the many jobs it cre-
ates compared to the few jobs it costs; the tastes, and more important, the
needs of our people that only imports can satisfy....
Even so, we can't ignore the workers, the industries and the communities that
suffer the consequences of increased imports.
Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, H.R. 11970,
Part I at 23941 (July 24, 1962) (statement of George Meany, President American Fed-
eration of Labor).
33. See id.
34. See Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, Appel-
late Body Report, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Korea-Dairy].
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cle 12.2, Members must provide the Committee on Safeguards
with all pertinent information including "evidence of serious in-
jury" or threat thereof caused by increased imports, a precise
description of the product involved and the proposed measure,
the proposed date of introduction, and the expected duration
and timetable for progressive liberalization. These requirements
should not be onerous to supply.
However, the Appellate Body in Korea - Dairy added that:
What constitutes "evidence of serious injury" is spelled out in
Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards which provides:
The competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors
of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on
the situation of the industry, in particular, the rate and
amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned
in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic mar-
ket taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales,
production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and
losses, and employment."
The Appellate Body, moreover, noted that the list of factors in
Article 12.2 and Article 4.2 were not exhaustive and the Commit-
tee on Safeguards could request additional information if neces-
sary. As collecting the type of information listed in the provi-
sions can be quite difficult for investigating authorities on many
sectors of the economy (if for no other reason, when industries
are highly fragmented and there are no trade association data
normally collected or available), the Appellate Body decision
may over time constitute a barrier to the use of safeguard provi-
sions because of lack of resources or data sources within coun-
tries.
Similarly, in Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Foot-
wear 6 ("Argentina-Footwear"), the Appellate Body went on to
state that under the "serious injury" requirement of Article
4.2(a), the competent authorities were required to evaluate, "at
a minimum, each of the factors listed in Article 4.2(a) as well as
others that are relevant to the situation of the industry con-
cerned." And, again, in United States-Wheat Gluten from the Euro-
pean Communities37 ("Weat Gluten"), the Appellate Body held
35. Id. at 33.
36. Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Argentina Footwear].
37. United States-Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, Appellate Body Re-
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that competent authorities may not limit their evaluation of "all
relevant factors" under Article 4.2(a) to the factors that inter-
ested parties raise, but rather, "[t]he competent authorities
must, in every case, carry out a full investigation to enable them
to conduct a proper evaluation of all relevant factors expressly
mentioned in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards."
It is suggested that panels and the Appellate Body need to
take a more practical approach to the problems of investigating
authorities or the WTO will need to modify the agreement lan-
guage to be sure meritorious cases are not prevented because of
evidentiary standards that become prohibitive.
B. Dispute Settlement
In 1988, the U.S. Congress declared that one of the "princi-
pal trade negotiating objectives" of the United States was a more
automatic and predictable dispute settlement process where
time delays could be reduced and countries would bring their
activities into compliance.3 8 In contrast, a major negotiating ob-
jective for many of the trading partners of the United States was
to constrain the United States and make it operate within the
system-more specifically, to curb the ability of the United States
to unilaterally determine, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, that U.S. commercial interests have been harmed by the
acts of its trading partners. 9 The system has worked fairly well
from the perspective of most Member nations who would agree
with Article 3.2 of the DSU that "[t] he dispute settlement system
port, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Wheat Gluten]. Although the Ap-
pellate Body reversed the panel's analysis and conclusions regarding causation of in-
jury, it found nevertheless that the U.S. International Trade Commission had not estab-
lished an adequate causal link between increased imports and serious injury to the
domestic industry. Id. In conclusion, the AB determined that the U.S. safeguards mea-
sure on wheat gluten from the EC was inconsistent with the Safeguards Agreement. Id.
38. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Title I at Section
1101(b) (1), P.L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1121 (Aug. 23, 1988); 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(1):
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to dis-
pute settlement are-(A) to provide for more effective and expeditious dis-
pute settlement mechanisms and procedures; and (B) to ensure that such
mechanisms within the GATT and GATT agreements provide for more effec-
tive and expeditious resolution of disputes and enable better enforcement of
United States rights.
Id.
39. See Terence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr, The W'O's First Two and a Half Years of
Dispute Resolution, 23 N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 481, 485-86 (1998).
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of the WTO is a central element in providing security and pre-
dictability to the multilateral trading system."40 Nevertheless,
there have been some, perhaps, unanticipated developments
that have put pressure on the system, for example: (1) the pub-
licity of "wins" or "losses" and the need to demonstrate that the
system is working for a country as well as against it, (2) the power
being wielded by the panels and Appellate Body is not easily
checked regardless of Members' perceptions that the panels are
overstepping, or creating new rights and obligations, and (3)
other possible problems in particular cases.
What follows is a partial list of topics that should be ex-
amined by the WTO as part of a new Round or otherwise.
1. Capacity of the system for disputes, and the implications
for panelists, for Appellate Body Members, and for the
budget needs;
2. Lessons learned from the first six years and modifications
to the system that would promote speed and efficiency
while preserving Member rights;
3. Whether Members are in fact being judicious in their se-
lection of disputes, including adherence to Article 3.7 of
the DSU ["Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise
its judgment as to whether action under these procedures
would be fruitful"];
4. Since the real parties in interest are often non-governmen-
tal entities, whether the system should be modified to per-
mit greater participation and protection of private-party
interests;
5. Whether panels and the Appellate Body should be using a
different standard of review in evaluating cases; and
6. Whether a mechanism is needed to permit challenges of
actions by the Appellate Body where perception of over-
stepping authority exists (not for resolution of the underly-
ing dispute but for future disputes).
Let's consider these six areas in dispute settlement and the
concerns raised by some for reform. As of the end of 2000, there
have been 216 requests for consultations involving 165 distinct
40. Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 3.2, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1127 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement
Understanding or DSU].
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matters-or an average of thirty-six requests per year.4' This is a
substantial increase from the GATT system, which generated ap-
proximately ten requests for consultations per year.4 2 The WTO
system does not envision that all requests for consultations will
result in the need for formal dispute settlement proceedings
through the request for a panel. Many matters have been re-
solved through consultations,43 although countries tend to pur-
sue the panel process more quickly under the WTO than was
true under the GATT. During the first six years of the WTO,
there have been a total of forty-five panel reports and Appellate
Body decisions (excluding reports resulting from proceedings
pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, which have totaled six to
date), with eighteen active cases as of December 13, 2000."4
Stated differently, during the first six years, there have been an
average of seven to eight panel and Appellate Body decisions
each year. While there has been a pick-up in the volume of deci-
sions rendered, the number remains small compared to the vol-
ume of matters handled by national courts. The U.S. Court of
International Trade, for example, publishes several hundred de-
41. World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-Play of W'O Disputes at
www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispue.htm.
42. Under the WTO's DSU, the workload of the WTO dispute settlement system
has been greatly expanded in comparison to the workload of its predecessor, the GATT
dispute settlement system. Counts of the total number of disputes addressed under the
GATT differ, but Professor Jackson estimates that over its existence (1948-1994), the
GATY system handled about 500 disputes.
It is interesting to note some of the statistics about cases brought under the
GATT system. There are various inventories. The GATT Analytical Index
through January 1995 contains 196 cases, but seems not to include most cases
for which no panel report was issued (usually because parties settled). It also
does not include cases under the separate Tokyo Round codes. A GATT docu-
ment in March 1994 notes 306 disputes contained in the GATT secretariat's
official inventory. Hudec's 1993 book analyses 207 complaints. Another
rough inventory that I compiled for many years includes many cases noted
from some informal sources, including some that were never brought as a
formal complaint. The disputes in this list number 418 to about mid-1994.
Thus it seems plausible that in some sense the GATT system has handled over
500 disputes since its inception.
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 120 (2nd ed., 1997). Thus, where the GATT system dealt with
about 10-11 case filings per year on average, the WTO system is handling about 35-36
complaints each year on average. Id.
43. BetweenJanuary 1, 1995 and December 13, 2000, 36 cases were settled or inac-
tive. See World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-Play of WO Disputes, at
www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispue.htm.
44. See id.
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cisions a year, although many are not on the merits. Even
though the number of panel and AB decisions is relatively small,
the system is straining under the existing load, and there is every
indication that the caseload will increase, not decrease, in the
years ahead.45 Many countries that have not traditionally been
complainants are developing internal capabilities or hiring
outside counsel to permit them to bring cases if for no other
reason than the domestic public relations need to demonstrate
that the WTO permits them to be plaintiffs as well as defendants
in particular matters.
There are significant problems in finding panelists who are
acceptable to the disputing parties.46 Selection issues delay the
start of panel proceedings and result in a slowing of the dispute
settlement process. Some Members, including the European
Union, are urging adoption of a permanent group of panelists
similar to what exists on the Appellate Body, but with a base
group larger than seven.4 v
Service on the Appellate Body is becoming increasingly time
consuming as an increasing percentage of panel reports are ap-
pealed.4" Appeals give the losing party additional time before
conformance is required and permit governments to tell their
constituents that they have done everything possible to maintain
the measure in question. The heavy caseload at the Appellate
Body, however, draws into question the ability of the Appellate
Body Members to handle the assignment on a part-time basis
and without relocating to Geneva. Obviously, any change in the
nature of the assignment will result in a change in the pool of
eligible Appellate Body Members. Similarly, the burden on Ap-
pellate Body Members increases when the collegiality require-
45. As of December 13, 2000, there were 80 pending consultations and 18 active
cases before the WTO. See Overview of the State-of-Play of WO Disputes, at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/disp_e/dispu-c.htm.
46. In cases where the parties cannot agree on panelists within 20 days of the estab-
lishment of the panel, Article 8.7 of the DSU authorizes the Director-General to ap-
point the panelists. See DSU art. 8.7.
47. See Terence P. Stewart & Amy A. Karpel, Review of the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing: Operation of Panels, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 593, 611 fn. 86 (2000), citing EU
Outlines Proposals for Changes to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct.
30, 1998, at 12.
48. If parties to the dispute do not agree with the Panel's determination, they may
appeal the panel report to the Appellate Body within 60 days of its circulation to the
public. See DSU art. 16.4. Third parties may not appeal the panel report although they
may make written submissions to the Appellate Body. See DSU art. 17.4.
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ments mandate the review of all cases by each Member, even
though a panel of three Members is charged with the decision-
making responsibility.49 Moving the Appellate Body in the direc-
tion of traditional appellate courts would let seven Members
handle more work. The price, however, might be the uniformity
in construction that the collegiality approach presumably spon-
sors.
Because Member nations of the WTO have an interest in
having documents translated into all official languages, there are
serious delays in the release of panel reports as the WTO's lim-
ited translation capabilities struggle with the increased require-
ments. 50 Moreover, because panel reports typically run hun-
dreds of pages in length and reflect all arguments made by all of
the parties, the process, even when personnel are available, is
time consuming and costly. Efforts have been made by some
countries to limit the contents of the panel report and not to
require translation of all of the parties' underlying documents if
such documents are included as attachments instead of being
folded into the report itself. To date, some countries have been
unwilling to permit a deviation from the requirements of full
translation into all three official languages. With a limited
budget and many Member nations unable or unwilling to signifi-
cantly increase the budget to address increased capacity needs,
translation alone can add months to the dispute settlement pro-
cess. This process will presumably become more cumbersome as
more cases are decided and as the official language list grows
over time. New countries that become Members will presumably
press for adding languages typically included in other multilat-
eral agreements as official languages, such as Chinese, Russian,
and Arabic.
Similarly, the review by Members of the dispute settlement
rules and procedures prior to the Seattle Ministerial Meeting
identified a host of technical issues51 the resolution of which
49. To ensure consistency and coherence in decision-making, all Appellate Body
Members meet on a regular basis to discuss matters of policy, practice and procedure.
See Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/1, at para. 4(1) (Feb. 15, 1996).
Moreover, Appellate Body Members receive all documents filed in an appeal and Mem-
bers remain informed on dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities of
the WTO. See id. at para. 4(2).
50. For a discussion on problems with the timeliness of translating panel reports,
see Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/46, at 15 (Aug. 6 1998).
51. See U.S., WfO Members Spilt Over How to Change DSUat Seattle, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
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could
(1) expedite proceedings (e.g., existing right to block re-
quest for a panel once; whether requests for panel must
be in sequential meetings); and
(2) clarify existing ambiguities (e.g., how to preserve the
right to compensation or retaliation while, at the same
time, permitting resolution of whether changes by a
member bring the country into compliance with its obli-
gations).
While it appeared likely that resolution of this package of modi-
fications was going to occur in Seattle, the difficulties that arose
on the overall launch of a new Round prevented closure on the
reforms identified from the review process.52
To prevent the system from bogging down with disputes, to
permit issues between nations to be addressed by less formal
means where possible, and to be sure that disputes are not pur-
sued where there are no realistic expectations that the dispute
will permit a solution, WTO Members are supposed to exercise
restraint when resorting to the dispute settlement system. Some
of these self-restraint notions can be seen in the DSU itself.53 In
fact, it is far from clear whether all, or most of, the major Mem-
bers are showing self-restraint. Looking at the number of dis-
putes and the stage at which complaints are registered in some
cases suggests otherwise.54 So do discussions with delegations in
Geneva which suggest that, for national political reasons, they
need to have the ability and record of bringing actions to show
that the system is working for their countries (a circumstance
usually present where a country has been a defendant in another
case which was lost). Developing countries have been con-
Nov. 26, 1999; see also Proposed Amendment of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Commu-
nication from Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Ecuador, the European Communities and its
member States, Hungary, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovenia, Switzerland,
Thailand and Venezuela, WT/MIN(99)/8, (Nov. 22, 1999).
52. See DSU Review Faces Substantive, Procedural Challenges After Seattle, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Dec. 24, 1999.
53. See DSU art. 3.7.
54. Two examples: (1) Canada's case on U.S. countervailing duty law as it pertains
to "export restraints," and (2) the request by the EU, Japan and six other members for
consultations on the so-called U.S. "Byrd Amendment" before the provision had been
implemented or made operational. See United States-Measures Treating Export Restraints
As Subsidies, Request for Consultations by Canada, WT/DS194/1 (May 19, 2000); Press
Release, European Union, U.S. Anti-Dumping Scheme: EUJoins WTO Partners in call
for consultations (Dec. 22, 2000) (on file with author).
2000]
672 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:652
cerned about the number of cases filed by the United States on
TRIPs and TRIMs issues when requests were pending for blanket
extensions of time.55 Korea and other countries expressed con-
cerns about cases in which developed countries file cases where
there is little economic interest in fact by the complainant (e.g.,
the EU challenge of a Korean safeguard action on dairy prod-
ucts; the U.S. challenge of the EU banana regime). Similarly,
there is a feeling among some Members that challenges are be-
ing filed, through the panel process, in an effort to win those
matters which countries were unable to win through negotia-
tions, despite the admonition that "recommendations and rul-
ings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obliga-
tions provided in the covered agreements. 56
With the inability of losing countries to block panel reports
or Appellate Body decisions and with the expanded jurisdiction
of the WTO as compared to the GATT, certain Members are
under significant pressure from the private sector-whether
businesses, workers, environmentalists, consumer groups or
others-to make the system more transparent, subject to rights
of participation by those who view their interests as being di-
rectly affected, and, generally, to make the system more demo-
cratic. While environmentalists and some consumer groups re-
ceive much of the media attention on NGO concerns with WTO
decision making, particularly in the dispute settlement process,
other groups are deeply concerned over the lack of rights when
their economic interests are directly affected by disputes
brought to and heard by the WTO. Businesses and workers that
seek access to foreign markets or seek the use of national laws to
provide conditions of fair trade or temporary import relief are
not allowed to participate in consultations or hearings or even to
have briefs considered by the panel or Appellate Body (although
amicus curiae briefs are, at least theoretically, permissible and
have been permitted in very limited circumstances).5
55. "TRIPs" refers to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RE
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). "TRIMs" refers to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs.e/legal_e/final-e.htm.
56. See DSU art. 3.2.
57. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle]. In
Shrimp-Turtle, the Appellate Body concluded that panels may use relevant information
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Moreover, different countries pursue different approaches
to private sector participation and representation. Some govern-
ments perceive that they do not have the internal capacity to
handle some or all of the disputes that they are involved in and,
consequently, will retain outside counsel who will prepare briefs,
make oral arguments, and generally control the approach taken
(subject, of course, to government agreement).58 Paid for by the
domestic industry affected, outside counsel have been involved
in the matter on behalf of the private sector for some time prior
to the dispute. In such situations, the private sector is substan-
tially represented by its counsel in fact. By contrast, other coun-
tries may try to handle all aspects of the dispute internally, al-
though they may be willing to receive input from private sector
parties. The real parties in interest may not be deputized and
may not be able to attend hearings. They will seldom be able to
defend the real party-in-interest's position during the proceed-
ing other than indirectly. Not surprisingly, there is often discon-
tent by those believing that their client's interests are not being
adequately represented by the government position.
While NGOs push hard for more open proceedings (includ-
ing public access to the hearings, the right of private parties to
submit amicus curiae briefs, etc.), there is strong resistance from
many Member nations. Such nations perceive NGOs (by defini-
tion, not Members of an intergovernmental organization) as
seeking rights that exceed those of Members (which cannot par-
ticipate where third-party rights are not timely asserted) and
(whether it be requested or non-requested) to make an informed decision. Panels are
given the authority to decide what information and technical advice they will consider
in making their objective determination of the case. Thus, although amicus curiae briefs
are accepted, it is up to the panel to decide what weight to give to such briefs.
58. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, Report of the Panel, Complaint by Ecuador, WTIT/DS27/R/ECU, Report of the
Panel, Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras, WT/DS27/R/GTM, Report of the
Panel, Complaint by Mexico, WT/DS27/R/MEX, Report of the Panel, Complaint by
United States, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas]. In EC-Ba-
nanas, the Appellate Body stated:
[W]e can find nothing in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (the "WTO Agreement"), the DSU or the Working Proce-
dures, nor in customary international law or the prevailing practice of interna-
tional tribunals, which prevents a WTO Member from determining the com-
position of its delegation in Appellate Body proceedings . .. it is for a WTO
Member to decide who should represent it as members of its delegation in an
oral hearing of the Appellate Body.
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complicating the ability of governments to resolve matters ami-
cably between themselves. 59 Although it has been in the fore-
front of those nations pushing for increased transparency and
access for the private sector, the United States routinely does not
deputize the private sector and is one of the countries capable of
handling matters internally without using the services of outside
counsel.
Another issue, particularly with respect to rules, is whether
the standard of review used by panels and the Appellate Body is
the proper one, at least where administrative records and fact
finding are involved. Case law established that the special rule
included in dispute settlement cases involving anti-dumping
matters6° is not applicable to other unfair trade disputes such as
countervailing duty matters.61
The spate of decisions in Safeguards, Subsidies and Anti-
dumping agreements cases also raises questions about the
proper role of panelists and Appellate Body Members in review-
ing cases and drawing answers from what are, typically, limited
portions of the overall record. Few panelists in rules decisions
have any experience either as an administrator or as a practi-
tioner in the types of matters being reviewed and hence have
little knowledge of the real world conditions in which investiga-
59. Although the United States has been a strong advocate of transparency in the
WTO, other countries have pressed only for limited changes in transparency. See, e.g.,
U.S. Rides Solo on Key WFO External Transparency Proposals, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 20,
2000. While the US believes that WTO committee meetings and DSB hearings should
be opened to the public, and that amicus briefs from NGOs should be accepted in DSB
proceedings, the EU and Australia propose more limited proposals such as de-restrict-
ing documents and holding annual meetings and symposia to incorporate the input of
outside groups. Id.
60. The Anti-dumping Agreement provides a specific standard of review for the
panel to follow in dumping cases. Article 17.6(i) states that:
[I]n its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether
their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment
of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation
should not be overturned.
Anti-dumping Agreement art. 17.6(i).
61. See United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000) [hereinafter US-Lead Bismuth Steel]. In US-Lead
Bismuth Steel, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that Article 17.6 applied only to
disputes under the Anti-dumping Agreement, and that it did not also apply to the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
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tions are conducted under tight internationally-agreed time-
lines. Records in these cases typically run to thousands of pages
and, in some jurisdictions, can run to hundreds-of-thousands or
even millions of pages. Those who use the rules under national
law have expressed at least two concerns about the standard of
review currently in place: (1) that it permits reviewing bodies to,
essentially, substitute their judgment as to what the facts are or
show (despite the fact that the panelists did not hold factual
hearings, conduct verification, or question the industry partici-
pants), and (2) that it allows panels to create constructions of
obligations that flow from silence in the agreements. Moreover,
it makes little sense to apply one standard of review to certain
administrative investigations but another standard to other ad-
ministrative investigations where there is no inherent or distin-
guishing difference in the conduct of the administrative pro-
ceedings that would justify disparate standards.
Additionally, there appears to be little consideration for
whether or not the interpretations adopted, and the require-
ments deemed existing on Members, are reasonable from an ad-
ministration perspective. If countries which have administered
these types of laws for decades, with their highly-developed and
sophisticated approaches to handling investigations, are repeat-
edly found to be doing so improperly and are further found to
be providing insufficient justification for their actions, what
hope is there for the many Members setting up systems for the
first time which have neither the infrastructure in place nor the
resources to conduct investigations at the same level of thor-
oughness? And what of those which have smaller staffs in the
agencies administering their laws? As noted above, fully 70% of
Safeguard actions in the first six years have been brought by de-
veloping countries. The rules must work not only for the devel-
oped countries but for developing countries, least developed
countries, and countries in transition. Yet, to date, no rules chal-
lenge (other than an initial case where transition rules indicated
the case was brought in the wrong forum) has failed. Apparently
all countries are unable to administer laws in a manner consis-
tent with their agreements. This record indicates that some-
thing is seriously wrong.
Finally, a number of countries expressed concerns over ac-
tions taken by the Appellate Body that appear to exceed the
scope of its authority yet remain unsusceptible to review by the
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Members. The flap that has been created by the Appellate Body
decision to authorize amicus curiae briefs would be one example
of such a situation.6 2 Another example would be an early deci-
sion by the Appellate Body in which, because it lacked remand
authority, it essentially applied facts to its construction of the law
on a matter that had not been resolved by the panel.63
Members will obviously embrace the current resolution of
some of the above issues while being concerned about others.
The breadth of the challenge in the dispute settlement system to
address the needs of Members and their constituencies suggests
that much needs to be done, and soon, on the dispute settle-
ment system.
II. RULES THAT AEED TO BE MAINTAINED
A. Anti-dumping
Article VI of the GATT 1947 (same language in GATT 1994)
addresses anti-dumping and countervailing duties. As stated in
Article VI:1:
The Contracting Parties recognize that dumping, by which
products of one country are introduced into the commerce
of another country at less than the normal value of the prod-
ucts, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material
injury to an established industry in the territory of a con-
tracting party or materially retards the establishment of a do-
mestic industry.
The terminology "is to be condemned," found in Article
VI:I of the GATT 1947 and now GATT 1994, is the harshest lan-
guage in the GATT, although some practices (e.g., export subsi-
dies) are prohibited. While developed countries have histori-
cally been the major users of anti-dumping laws, consistent with
the relatively high percentage of imports subject to tariff bind-
ings in developed countries and relatively low percentage of
bindings in many developing countries, as more developing
countries undertake significant market liberalization, they have
found need to have national laws implementing the WTO rights
for fair trade conditions represented by Article VI when price
62. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, W/'O Appellate Body Under Fire For Move on Acceptance of
Amicus Briefs, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Nov. 27, 2000.
63. See Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997).
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discrimination by imports has caused material injury to their do-
mestic industries.
Anti-dumping laws originated in Canada at the turn of the
last century, and, later, were enacted in South Africa, Australia,
the United States and parts of Europe by the 1920s."4 The anti-
dumping provisions of Article VI, the various anti-dumping
Codes, and now, the Agreement implementing the provisions of
Article VI have been important elements in the willingness of
countries to liberalize, as they provide some assurances that com-
munities, companies and their workers will not be destroyed by
false market signals.
While the use of anti-dumping laws is controversial in some
circles, historically, relatively small volumes of trade have been
addressed by anti-dumping cases at any given time (typically less
than one or 2% for the major users)." During the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations, countries negotiated a very de-
tailed agreement to implement Article VI, although some issues
of importance to countries needing to use anti-dumping laws
have not been resolved, such as the problem of circumvention.
There has now been, at most, five to six years of experience
under the modified national laws. One sees a growing use of the
law by non-traditional users. This should be good news to sup-
porters of the rule of law and a liberalized trading system. Typi-
cally, there are relatively few cases brought by any particular
country, and the cases cover a relatively small portion of trade.
Concerns about compliance with the agreement reached
can, of course, be pursued through consultations and dispute
settlement. An increasing number of anti-dumping disputes
have been brought. Subject to the concerns raised in the prior
section on the functioning of the dispute settlement system, se-
64. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1389-1404.
65. See, e.g., the following statement by former Commerce Secretary William M.
Daley:
In 1998, total U.S. imports were approximately US$900 billion. Only about
US$4 billion of those imports were covered by anti-dumping duty orders.
That means that 0.44% - less than one-half of one percent - of our worldwide
imports were covered. Even if imports covered by countervailing duty orders
were added in, the figure only increases to 0.50%.
William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce, Before the Senate Finance Committee,
(Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/106f/daley
0929.htm.
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lected review of decisions is a good thing as it ensures compli-
ance with agreed norms.
For a number of years efforts have been underway to ex-
amine certain technical issues, to exchange views on how the is-
sues are addressed by various nations and, hopefully, to reach
some common approaches to construing certain terms. In fact,
since April 1999, the WTO's Ad Hoc Group on Implementation
has discussed six topics with the goal of developing an under-
standing on these issues.66 These six issues are:
1. Practical issues and experience in applying Article 2.4.2;
2. Termination of investigations under Article 5.8 in cases of
de minimis import volume;
3. Practical issues and experience in cases involving cumula-
tion under Article 3.3;
4. Practical issue and experience with respect to question-
naires and requests for information under Articles 6.1 and
6.1.1;
5. Practical issues and experience in providing opportunities
for industrial users and consumer organizations to provide
information under Article 6.12; and
6. Practical issues and experience in conducting "new ship-
per" reviews under Article 9.5.67
While certain external events (e.g., the financial crisis in
Asia, and the collapse of demand in the former Soviet Union)
have created fundamental equilibrium problems for certain in-
dustries which have resulted in a large number of dumping and
countervailing duty actions, the relatively heavy recent use of the
laws to address these phenomena reflects both a satisfaction of
the criteria of Article VI and the Anti-dumping Agreement and
the lack of alternative tools within the WTO to address structural
excess capacity problems, an issue addressed in a later section.
Similarly, while there have been requests as part of the im-
plementation examination within the WTO to rebalance the
agreement by certain countries, there is no demonstration that
any rebalancing is in fact appropriate at this stage. An examina-
tion of the use of the agreement since 1995 is illuminating. As of
November 3, 2000, the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Prac-
66. See Report (2000) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8,
2000).
67. See Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Note from the Secretariat, G/ADP/W/
410 (Aug. 6, 1999).
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tices reported that some sixty-four Members (the EU being one
Member) notified anti-dumping legislation including the follow-
ing countries:
Developing countries (46):
Argentina El Salvador Mauritius Singapore
Barbados Fiji Mexico South Africa
Bolivia Ghana Morocco Thailand
Brazil Guatemala Nicaragua Trinidad and
Chile Honduras Pakistan Tobago
Colombia India Panama Tunisia
Costa Rica Indonesia Paraguay Turkey
Cuba Jamaica Peru Uganda
Cyprus Kenya Philippines Uruguay
Dominica Korea Saint Lucia Venezuela
Ecuador Malawi Senegal Zambia
Egypt Malaysia Zimbabwe
Countries in transition (9):
Bulgaria Kyrgyz Republic Poland Slovak Republic
Czech Republic Latvia Romania Slovenia
Hungary
Developed and other (9):
Australia Iceland Japan Norway
Canada Israel New Zealand United States
EC
Source: Report (2000) of the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8,
2000).
Twenty-four Members indicated that they do not have an anti-
dumping law:
Bahrain Benin Botswana Brunei Darussalam
Burkina Faso Chad Cote d'Ivoire Dominican
Estonia Rep. of Guinea Haiti Republic
Liechtenstein Macau Maldives Hong Kong
Mongolia Namibia Qatar Malta
Suriname Swaziland Switzerland Sri Lanka
United Arab
Emirates
Source: Report (2000) of the WTO Committee on Anti Dumping Practices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8,
2000).
And, thirty-six Members had not provided notifications:
Albania Dem. Rep. of Kuwait Oman
Angola Congo Lesotho Papua New Guinea
Antigua & Barbuda Djibouti Madagascar Rwanda
Bangladesh Gabon Mali St. Kitts & Nevis
Belize Gambia Mauritania St. Vincent &
Burundi Georgia Mozambique Grenadines
Cameroon Grenada Myanmar Sierra Leone
Central African Guinea Bissau Niger Solomon Islands
Rep. Guyana Nigeria Tanzania
Congo Jordan Togo
Source: Report (2000) of the WFO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8, 2000).
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It is known that some countries (e.g., Nigeria) have anti-
dumping laws although not necessarily modified to conform to
the Uruguay Round Agreement while other countries (e.g., Esto-
nia) are in the process of adopting laws. Similarly, some of the
major countries seeking to join the WTO also have anti-dumping
laws in place (e.g., China, Russia, and the Ukraine).
Since the creation of the WTO, there has been a significant
increase in the number of cases brought by developing coun-
-tries, including cases against other developing countries. For ex-
ample, a compilation of measures taken (versus cases initiated)
through 1991 showed that Australia, the United States, the EC,
and Canada accounted for just under 90% of all anti-dumping
measures (through 1991, 1621 out of 1841, or 88%).68 Develop-
ing countries, by contrast, accounted for just 5.9% of all mea-
sures taken. BetweenJuly 1, 1994 andJune 30, 2000, these four
developed country Members (Australia, US, EC, Canada) ac-
counted for 48.6% of the cases brought and 55.8% of measures
in effect on June 30, 2000 (this may overstate the actual percent
since a number of users other than the four historic users did
not report total measures in effect on June 30, 2000).
Developing countries have become the largest users in most
years and accounted for 52.3% of all cases initiated in the last six
years (July 1, 1994 through June 30, 2000).69 Indeed, between
June 30, 1995 and June 30, 2000, reported measures in effect for
the four historic users declined from 660 to 626 and from 79.9%
to 55.8% (in the same period, all developed countries (including
New Zealand, Japan, and Israel in addition to the four other
68. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1695-97.
69. It should be noted that reference to the number of cases initiated does not
equate to the number of cases that result in orders. A large percentage of anti-dump-
ing initiations do not, in fact, result in the imposition of anti-dumping duties or other
remedial measures. In the United States, for example, over the last 20 years, less than
half of the cases initiated resulted in orders.
[M]ost anti-dumping cases filed have not resulted in the application of duties.
In cases in which a determination was issued, more have been rejected by the
Commerce Department or the U.S. ITC than have been granted anti-dumping
relief.... [F]rom 1980 to 1997, only about 44% of the anti-dumping cases
filed have resulted in the imposition of anti-dumping duties.
GREG MASTEL, ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE, ANTI-DUMPING LAWS AND THE U.S. ECON-
OMY 104 (1998). In the period 1980-1997, 732 anti-dumping cases were filed. Of that
total, 315 (44%) had resulted in duties being imposed, 17 (2.4%) had resulted in sus-
pension agreements, 383 (53.6%) had been either rejected, dismissed, or withdrawn,
and 17 were still pending (as of 1998). Id. at 30-31.
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Members) went from 684 measures to 643). At the same time,
measures reported by developing country Members of the WTO
(with a number of developing countries not reporting measures
in effect) went from 166 to 494, with South Africa, India and
Mexico all having more measures outstanding by mid-2000 than
Australia and exceeding or being close to the number of mea-
sures outstanding in Canada, even though the latter two coun-
tries have substantially greater trade flows. The table below re-
views the number of cases initiated during the most recent six-
year time period. It shows that thirty-three of the sixty-four
countries reporting anti-dumping laws in place used them.
Anti-dumping Cases Initiated (July 1994 -June 2000)
7/1/99 7/1/98 7/1/97 7/1/96 7/1/95 7/1/94
through through through through through through
6/30/00 6/30/99 6/30/98 6/30/97 6/30/96 6/30/95
Australia 18 18 35 22 8 6
Canada 11 17 10 8 6 9
EC 49 41 44 26 16 37
Israel 1 3 5 7 4 NA
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Zealand 6 4 5 1 9 9
United States 17 43 28 20 16 30
Subtotal 102 126 127 84 59 91
Argentina 23 15 8 18 42 6
Brazil 17 12 12 19 1 12
Chile 1 0 2 2 4 2
Colombia 3 8 0 1 5 1
Costa Rica 0 1 NA NA NA NA
Ecuador 0 NA 1 NA NA NA
Egypt 4 1 5 NA NA NA
Guatemala 0 0 0 NA 1 NA
India 26 38 11 20 5 9
Indonesia 13 0 11 9 NA NA
Korea 4 5 5 18 6 3
Malaysia 1 1 8 2 0 NA
Mexico 7 12 8 5 3 18
Nicaragua 0 2 NA NA NA NA
Panama 0 2 NA NA NA NA
Peru 4 5 5 3 4 4
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Philippines 4 3 1 2 0 NA
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 2
South Africa 11 32 23 11 14 9
Thailand 0 0 0 1 0 0
Trinidad & Tobago 0 5 0 NA NA NA
Turkey 0 7 0 5 0 2
Venezuela 0 10 7 0 5 1
Subtotal 118 159 107 116 90 69
Czech Rep. 1 2 NA NA NA NA
Poland 0 3 1 NA NA NA
Slovenia 0 1 NA NA NA NA
Subtotal 1 6 1 NA NA NA
TOTAL 221 291 235 1200 1149 1160
Sources: Report (2000) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8, 2000);
Report (1999) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/340 (Nov. 1, 1999); Report
(1998) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/268, (Nov. 5, 1998); Report (1997)
of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/204 (Nov. 6, 1997); Report (1996) of the
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/123 (Oct. 29, 1996); Report (1995) of the
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/34 (Nov. 14, 1995).
Countries typically bring cases against major trading part-
ners, which obviously varies by country and region. Because the
United States, for example, is the major exporter to both Ca-
nada and Mexico (accounting for 75.6% of imports into Mexico
in 1996 and 67.5% of imports into Canada in 1997), although
the number of cases is small for the volume of trade between the
countries, it is not surprising that a fair proportion of Mexican
(eleven of fifty-three initiations) and Canadian (eleven of sixty-
one) cases are against imports from the United States. Similarly,
Argentina's major trading partner is Brazil. Accordingly, it has a
fair number of cases against imports from Brazil (twenty-one of
112 brought in the last six years). The same is true for other
countries. At the same time, where there is significant integra-
tion of economies in regional arrangements, there is less need
for cases against imports as tariff barriers are removed (e.g.,
NAFTA countries). When integration is sufficiently deep, coun-
tries may forego dumping relief altogether on intraregional
trade (e.g., EU). Countries with significant trade barriers (tar-
iffs, NTBs, etc.) and substantial exports are subject to a larger
number of cases over time.
Generally speaking, many of the major exporters from the
developing world continue to have significantly higher tariff
[Vol. 24:652
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rates than do most developed countries and tend to be subject to
somewhat higher levels of trade cases over time. Typically, and
similar to the experience of most developed countries, develop-
ing countries with wide open markets, including Singapore and
Hong Kong, are subject to few cases. Very diversified export
platforms will typically see fewer cases than do economies that
are heavily dependent on a limited range of products. Some
items, such as energy, are typically not subject to trade actions
simply because of the need for imports. Hence, regions heavily
dependent upon energy for exports do not have a high inci-
dence of dumping cases brought against their exports.
Countries with economic systems that are significantly state-
controlled or state-driven, or are in periods of transition from
state-controlled to market economies, often find that their pro-
ducers do not have reliable market signals on true costs of pro-
duction or existing pricing levels in global markets. In such situ-
ations, it is not uncommon for there to be rapid export spurts at
very low prices that disrupt markets in a number of countries.
The largest subject of cases by WTO Members in the last six
years has been, not surprisingly, the People's Republic of
China-163 cases around the world, twenty two to thirty-one
cases per year. The Peoples Republic of China, which enjoys a
rapid expansion of exports across a broad spectrum of products
(China's exports, in total, increased 271.4% from 1990 through
1999 compared to world trade increases of 82.1 %), typically
prices its products far below exporters in any other country and
continues to have substantial state involvement in many ele-
ments of the economy.
Because of collapsed demand within the region of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (or "CIS") (basically, the for-
mer Soviet Union), there have been a high number of cases di-
rected at CIS countries for the volume of overall trade in dis-
crete sectors, usually concerning metals involving Russia, the
Ukraine and other countries from the region. Thus, there have
been 112 cases initiated on non-WTO parts of the CIS with most
cases against imports from the Russian Federation (fifty-two) and
the Ukraine (thirty). Because the Ukraine has been successful
in exporting only a narrow range of products, its exports tend to
both be concentrated in a few HS numbers and increase rapidly
when entered into new markets, usually at very low prices. Thus,
in the last six years, the Ukraine has the highest incidence of
2000]
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anti-dumping cases initiated for a given export volume of any
major exporting nation in the world.
Sixty-five cases were brought against WIG Members from
Central and Eastern Europe and those CIS Members that joined
the WTO over the last several years. Consider the following ra-
tios for various regions, showing the average amount of trade (in
millions of U.S. dollars) per anti-dumping case initiated:7 °
Central and Eastern Europe, Baltic States and CIS: 1,209.2/case













" Other countries: 2,933.5
USA and Canada: 11,119.1/case
" USA: 9,394.8
" Canada: 23,844.6
Western Europe: 9,641.5/case - excluding intra-EU trade: 3,966.1/case
* EU: 10,333.9
- excluding intra-EU trade: 3,770.8
70. The ratios were calculated as millions of dollars of global trade by the region in
1999 divided by the number of cases initiated against imports from countries within the
region by WTO members between July 1, 1994, and June 30, 2000. The 1999 export
trade data was taken from WTO, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATIS-
TICS 164-67, tbl. A-3 (World merchandise exports by region and selected economies,
1989-1999).
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Africa: 3,503/case (only 5 countries have had cases filed; only South Africa
and Egypt face many cases)
0 South Africa: 1,214.0
0 Egypt: 593.2
0 Other Africa: 20,458.5
Middle East: 12,150.0/case





* People's Republic of China: 1,197.2













World (excluding intra-EU trade): 3,420.2/case
The foregoing data are also graphically presented in the chart,
on the following page.
As the foregoing data demonstrates, the frequency of anti-
dumping cases correlates closely with expected behavior. Pro-
ducers that export aggressively and operate behind closed mar-
kets will be subject to. anti-dumping cases more frequently than
exporters operating in highly open markets. The existence of
the anti-dumping remedy provides a strong basis for govern-
ments of developed countries, developing countries, and coun-
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tries in transition to support further liberalization of trade in
goods. Producers that perceive that they are losing in the mar-
ketplace because of false market signals can address them with
existing rules. The data does not suggest any need to reopen the
Anti-dumping Agreement at the present time. While there was
an increase in anti-dumping activity during the severe financial
crisis in Asia and the Russian Federation (with resulting surges
in the exportation of many product categories), it is exactly the
existence of the remedies under Article VI that prevents internal
pressures from building to the point at which broader restraints
that are not rules-based are sought.
At the same time, there is no demonstrable need for special
treatment for developing countries. There have been almost no
cases against the least-developed countries. Such countries'
trade volumes normally would not qualify under existing anti-
dumping provisions and consequently would face no activity.
Malawi and Zimbabwe, two WTO Members in Africa with smaller
economies against whom cases were brought, faced cases only
from South Africa, a neighboring developing country.
Indeed, seventy-three countries-sixty-nine of which were
developing or least-developed countries within the WTO (and
four of which were either developed (Iceland), a country in tran-
sition (Albania), or essentially energy exporters (Oman, Bru-
nei)-have faced no initiation of an action in the last six years.
Of the sixty-seven Members (developed, developing, and in tran-
sition) who did face one or more actions, only twenty-eight
(fourteen developed and fourteen developing) faced more than
one case per year. The developed countries were Canada, Aus-
tralia, Japan, the United States, and various countries within the
EU. The fourteen developing countries against which more
than one case was filed were major developing countries:
Anti-dumping cases: 1995-2000
Number of Average 1999 Export Average
Developing cases filed Number of Trade Data Appligi
Country Member against Member cases per year (Millions US$) Tariff
Korea 96 cases 16.0 cases 144,745 7.9
Hong Kong 13 cases 2.2 cases 174,408 0
71. The average applied tariff rates listed are derived from the most recent WTO
Trade Policy Review ("TPR") for each country. It should be noted that the average
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Malaysia 22 cases 3.7 cases 84,455 8.1
India 48 cases 8 cases 36,560 35.0
Indonesia 51 cases 8.5 cases 84,455 9.5
Singapore 9 cases 1.5 cases 114,689 1.1
Thailand 45 cases 7.5 cases 58,392 18.4
Turkey 18 cases 3 cases 26,028 12.7
South Africa 23 cases 3.8 cases 26,707 15.1
Chile 12 cases 2 cases 15,616 11.0
Venezuela 7 cases 1.2 cases 19,852 12.0
Brazil 47 cases 7.8 cases 48,011 12.5
Argentina 8 cases 1.3 cases 23,333 13.5
Mexico 23 cases 3.8 cases 136,703 13.6
TOTAL 422 cases
7 2  70.3 cases 993,95473
Sources: Report (2000) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8, 2000);
Report (1999) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/340 (Nov. 1, 1999); Report (1998)
of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/268, (Nov. 5, 1998); Report (1997) of the
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/204 (Nov. 6, 1997); Report (1996) of the Committee on
Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/123 (Oct. 29, 1996); Report (1995) of the Committee on Anti-
Dumping Practices, G/L/34 (Nov. 14, 1995); WTO, ANNuAL REPORT 2000, INTERNATIONAL
TRAiEn STAISICS, 164-67, tbl. A-3 (World merchandise exports by region and selected
economies, 1989-99); and the most recent WTO Trade Policy Reviews for the listed countries.
These fourteen developing countries initiated 161 of the
tariffs were not all calculated in the same manner or on the same basis. The sources
were as follows: WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REvIEw-Korea, 27, WT/
TPR/S/19 (1996) ("simple tariff" average for 1994); WoRLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Hong Kong, China, 26, WT/TPR/S/52 (1998) (applied tariff);
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Malaysia, 41, WT/TPR/WT/31
(1997) ("ad valorem" duties); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEW-
India, 45, WT/TPR/S/33 (1998)("simple average 'effective' (i.e., applied) m.f.n.
tariff'); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVEw--Indonesia, 50, WT/TPR/
S/51 (1998) ("simple average" MFN tariff); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY
REVIEw-Singapore, 35, WT/TPR/S/137 (1996) (average collected rate); WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Thailand, 38, WT/TPR/S/63 (1999) ("simple
average" applied tariff); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Turkey,
40, WT/TPR/S/44 (1998) ("simple average" MFN tariff); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
TRADE POLICY REVIEW-South Africa, 41, WT/TPR/S/34 (1998) ("simple average" MFN
import tariff); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Chile, 43 WT/
TPR/S/28 (1997)(ad valorem tariff based on c.i.f. value); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Venezuela, 52, WT/TPR/S/27 (1996)(ad valorem tariffs);
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Brazil, 41, WT/TPR/S/21
(1996)("simple average" applied tariff); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY
REVIEw-Argentina, 46, WT/TPR/S/34 (1999) (average applied tariff); WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEW-Mexico, 43, WT/TPR/S/29 (1997)("simple
average" applied MFN tariff).
72. The total number of cases filed against these fourteen developing countries
(422) represents 33.6% of all anti-dumping initiations over the 1995-2000 period.
73. The total value of the 1999 exports of these fourteen developing countries
(US$993,954,000) equals 23.4% of world trade (excluding intra-EU trade).
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422 cases (38.2%) against each other. Cases brought by other
WTO Members that are also developing countries account for an
additional 8% of cases against the fourteen developing countries
mentioned above. This means that 46.2% of all cases filed
against these fourteen developing countries were filed by other
developing countries."4
In addition, developed countries with outstanding orders
for products produced within their borders find the bulk of such
orders to be limited to industries where there are significant ex-
cess-capacity problems, such as steel. For example, in the semi-
annual report submitted by the United States to the WTO anti-
dumping committee, the United States reported that it had four-
teen anti-dumping orders outstanding on imports from Korea,
ten of which were steel mill products.75 Similarly, one of two
orders for South Africa, one of three for Singapore, four of
seven for Mexico, three of six for India, the only order on Vene-
zuela, two of four for Thailand, all five for Argentina, and seven
of thirteen for Brazil were for steel mill products.7 6 Develop-
ment of rules on structural excess capacity could dramatically
reduce the cases brought by all countries and, in particular,
cases brought against leading developing countries by developed
countries.
As the WTO's work program moves ahead, the Committee's
work on anti-dumping issues should focus on completing its
work on the open anti-circumvention concerns, continuing re-
view of individual Member laws and regulations to ensure con-
formance with international obligations, and continuing the
technical work needed to determine different nations' ap-
proaches to the construction of the same provisions. An exami-
nation of the appropriate type of technical assistance needed for
74. In addition, nearly 30% of the cases filed in the last six years involved countries
who are not WTO members, although many were against countries that are at various
stages of the accession process.
75. Committee on Anti-Dumping, Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4 of the
Agreement-United States, G/ADP/N/65/USA (Oct. 6, 2000).
76. Id. at 26-32. See also Committee on Anti-Dumping, Semi-Annual Report Under
Article 16.4 of the Agreement-Europe Communities, G/ADP/N/65/EEC (Aug. 17,
2000) (India, 8 of 14 cases involve steel mill products); Committee on Anti-Dumping, Semi-
Annual Report Under Article 16.4 of the Agreement-Canada, G/ADP/N/65/CAN
(Aug. 30, 2000) at 6-8 (cases involving steel mill products: Argentina, 1 of 1; Brazil, 3 of
4; India, 3 of 4; Indonesia, 1 of 2; Korea, 3 of 4; Mexico, 1 of 1; South Africa, 1 of 1;
Thailand 2 of 3; and Venezuela, 1 of 1).
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new user nations will ensure a speedy learning curve and compli-
ance with existing obligations. Reopening the Anti-dumping
Agreement, however, would be premature.
B. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
More sensitive to many governments than remedies for in-
ternational price discrimination is the effort to regulate, in cer-
tain circumstances, the actions of nation states or their regional
and local governments in the provision of benefits to businesses.
Governments routinely raise money from a wide variety of
sources for the support of government services and other pro-
grams. Many governments encourage the development of indus-
tries or regions by addressing economic or physical emergencies.
They also encourage the building of infrastructure, the under-
writing of costs of certain foods and medicines to portions of the
population, and many other activities that can result in the provi-
sion of advantages for domestic producers over foreign competi-
tors. Governments are frequently torn between their allegiances
to both sides of the issue: wanting the freedom to conduct na-
tional policy in a manner necessary to the welfare of the nation
but at the same time, not wanting those domestic producers
which participate in international commerce to be disadvan-
taged due to the deep pockets of other governments. Thus, na-
tion states provide both a wide array of subsidies themselves and,
for more than one hundred years, remedies to address adverse
effects from subsidies provided by others. For example, sugar
subsidies provided by the Russian government were the targets
of the first countervailing duty law in the United States, which
was enacted in 1890.77
Articles VI and XVI of GATT 1947 address the question of
subsidies and the remedies that governments could provide.
The wide prevalence of export subsidies on primary commodi-
ties and agricultural goods led to a split approach to export sub-
sidies for much of the life of the GATT, and, most recently, the
WTO. Consider the language of Article XVI of GATT 1947, as
modified and incorporated as GATT 1994 (under the WTO,
there are no longer "Contracting Parties" but "Members"):
Section A - Subsidies in General
77. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 812-13.
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1. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy,
including any form of income or price support, which op-
erates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any prod-
uct from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its ter-
ritory, it shall notify the contracting parties in writing of
the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the esti-
mated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the
affected product or products imported into or exported
from its territory and of the circumstances making the sub-
sidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined
that serious prejudice to the interests of any other con-
tracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidi-
zation, the contracting party granting the subsidy shall,
upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or
parties, or with the contracting parties, the possibility of
limiting the subsidization.
Section B - Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a
contracting party of a subsidy on the export of any product
may have harmful effects for other contracting parties,
both importing and exporting, may cause undue distur-
bance to their normal commercial interests, and may hin-
der the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the
use of subsidies on the export of primary products. If,
however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly
any form of subsidy which operates to increase the export
of any primary product from its territory, such subsidy
shall not be applied in a manner which results in that con-
tracting party having more than an equitable share of
world export trade in that product, account being taken of
the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the
product during a previous representative period, and any
special factors which may have affected or may be affecting
such trade in the product.
4. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable
date thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant ei-
ther directly or indirectly any for of subsidy on the export
of any product other than a primary product which sub-
sidy results in the sale of such product for export at a price
lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31 De-
cember 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope
of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 Janu-
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ary 1955 by the introduction of new, or the extension of
existing, subsidies.
5. The contracting parties shall review the operation of the
provisions of this Article from time to time with a view to
examining its effectiveness, in the light of actual experi-
ence, in promoting the objectives of this Agreement and
avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to the trade or
interests of contracting parties.
78
Article VI of the GATT 1947 and 1994 provides nations with
a domestic remedy similar to those of anti-dumping actions
when imported products benefit from subsidies through actions.
The practice investigated is the subsidization of the exported
product and material injury to a domestic industry.
Subsidy concerns have seesawed back and forth over the
years in terms of GATT's, and now the WTO's, focus. In the
1970s and 1980s, the United States aggressively pursued the sub-
sidization practices of trading partners, but did not have a mate-
rial injury standard for cases involving dutiable merchandise, a
practice "grandfathered" under the GATT prior to the Tokyo
Round agreements. This led many trading nations to seek
clearer rules on what was actionable in fact and to require the
United States to apply a material injury test in its domestic legis-
lation. The Tokyo Round Agreement on Interpretation and Ap-
plication of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (the Subsidies Code) recognized
"that subsidies are used by governments to promote important
objectives of national policy."79
Many major developed agricultural exporting nations used
significant financial resources to promote their agricultural
products in export markets. Similarly, the crisis in the steel in-
dustry resulted in massive, global infusions of money by state
treasuries to keep companies and facilities afloat or to expand
capacity. Again, major civil aircraft producing nations raised ac-
cusations of substantial subsidization of foreign producers as did
lumber industries concerned about national policies restricting
access to materials. These major subsidization issues led to the
Uruguay Rounds' adoption of limitations and initial reductions
78. GATT 1994 art. XVI.
79. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Preamble, reprinted in GATT, 26th Supp.
BISD 56 (1980).
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on agricultural export subsidies and potentially trade-distorting
domestic subsidies.8 0 The creation of a new subsidy agreement
provided, for the first time, a definition of a subsidy and defined
categories of subsidies (i.e., prohibited, actionable, and non-ac-
tionable) ." It identified ways of addressing valuation issues, ex-
amples of serious prejudice and defenses to such a finding. s2 In
short, the Uruguay Round Agreements continued the process of
clarifying the type of government intervention that was likely to
be viewed as trade distortive. It expanded on the notion of pro-
hibited subsidies, and provided fairly clear guidelines as to how
governments could take actions that would not be subject to in-
ternational interference.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(or "SCM Agreement") requires Members to provide "new and
full" notifications periodically and annual updates on the types
and levels of subsidies provided. These requirements, however,
did not enjoy a high rate of compliance. As reviewed in the Re-
port (2000) of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures:
6. 1998 new and full notifications. Pursuant to Article 25.1 of
the Agreement and Article XVI:I of GATT 1994, all Mem-
bers of the Committee were required to submit a new and
full notification of subsidies to the Committee by 30 June
1998. As of 7 November 2000, only 28 WTO Members
(the EC is counted as one Member) had notified subsidies
pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement and Article XVI of
GATT 1994. In addition, 18 Members had notified that
they maintain no subsidies notifiable pursuant to these
provisions. These notifications may be found in document
series G/SCM/N/38/.... Seventy-four Members had sub-
mitted no notification as of the close of the period covered
by this Report. A table indicating the status of 1998 notifi-
cations is reproduced in Annex A to this Report.8"
Some important trading nations, including Colombia, Hungary,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Romania,
80. See generally Agreement on Agriculture; Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs.e/legal_e/final_e.html [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
81. SCM Agreement arts. 1, 3, 5, 8.
82. Id. at Annex IV, Annex V.
83. Report (2000) of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/L/408
(Nov. 10, 2000).
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South Africa, and Venezuela, did not provide the 1998 "new and
full" subsidy notifications. The remaining non-notifiers are typi-
cally smaller players in international trade, including many of
the least developed countries.8 4
A "peace clause '8 5 found within the Agreement on Agricul-
ture results in a relatively small number of cases on agricultural
subsidies actually brought to the WTO. There was, however, sig-
nificant activity within the WTO dispute settlement body on sub-
sidy practices, particularly export subsidies, in the first six years
of the WTO's existence. For example, there were panel reports
and, in many cases, Appellate Body rulings on nine cases, six of
which involved allegations of prohibited subsidies (as defined in
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement):
Subsidy Disputes at the WTO (1995-2000)
Panel & AB
Dispute Issue Reports
1 Brazil-Measures Whether Brazil's imposition of WT/DS22/R (Oct.
Affecting Desiccated countervailing duties on Philippine 17, 1996)
Coconut, WT/DS22 coconut fruit was consistent with WT/DS22/AB/R
Article VI of GATT 1994. (Feb. 21, 1997)
2 Indonesia-Certain Whether Indonesia extended the WT/DS54R, WT/
Measures Affecting scope of tariff and tax subsidies in a DS55/R, WT/
the Automobile manner inconsistent with Article 28 of DS59/R, WT/
Industry, WT/DS54, the SCM Agreement; whether subsidies DS64/R (July 2,
55, 59 & 64 under the National Motor Vehicle 1998)
Programme have caused serious
prejudice or a threat thereof to the
interests of other Member states
according to Articles 6 and 27 of the
SCM Agreement.
84. Id. at 5. Although the 2000 Report indicated that Brazil had not submitted
notifications for 1998, in fact, Brazil did submit a "new and full" notification on Novem-
ber 21, 2000 (not published until January 2001) covering the period 1996-1999. See New
and Full and Updating Notifications Pursuant to Article XVI:I of the GAT 1994 and Article 25
of the SCM Agreement-Brazil, G/SCM/N/25/BRA, G/SCM/N/38/BRA, G/SCM/N/
48/BRA, G/SCM/N/60/BRA (Jan. 8, 2001).
85. See Agreement on Agriculture art. 13.
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3 Brazil-Export Whether Brazil's PROEX interest WT/DS46/R (Apr.
Financing equalization payments, in general, or 14, 1999)
Programme for in respect to particular transactions WT/DS46/AB/R
Aircraft, WT/DS46 are export subsidies within the (Aug. 2, 1999)
meaning of Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement that are not covered by the
exception in item (k) of the
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies or
exempted by the developing country
exception in Article 27.2(b) of the
SCM Agreement).
4 Canada-Measures Whether Canada's benefits provided to WT/DS70/R (Apr.
Affecting the Export corporations established to facilitate 14, 1999)
of Civilian Aircraft, the export of civil aircraft and/or to WT/DS/AB/R
WT/DS70 the aircraft industry were export (Aug. 2, 1999)
subsidies within the meaning of Article
3 of the SCM Agreement.
5 Australia-Subsidies Whether Australia's loan to or grant WT/DS126/R
Provided to Producers payments to an Australian automotive (May 25, 1999)
and Exporters of leather producer were export subsidies
Automotive Leather, within the meaning of Article 3 of the
WT/DS126 SCM Agreement.
6 Canada-Measures Whether Canada's subsidies on dairy WT/DS103/R,
Affecting the products were consistent with Article 3 WT/DS113/R
Importation of Milk of the SCM Agreement. (May 17, 1999)
and the Exportation WT/DS103/AB/R,
of Daiy Products, WT/DS113/AB/R
WT/DS103, 113 (Oct. 13, 1999)
7 United States-Tax Whether U.S. tax exemptions and WT/DS108/R
Treatment for special administrative pricing rules for (Oct. 8, 1999)
"Foreign Sales foreign sales corporation were WT/DS108/AB/R
Corporations," WT/ subsidies within the meaning of Article (Feb. 24, 2000)
DS108 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement.
8 United States- Whether U.S. imposition of WT/DS138/R
Imposition of countervailing duties on certain hot- (Dec. 23, 1999)
Countervailing Duties rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel WT/DS138/AB/R
on Certain Hot- products from the United Kingdom I (May 10, 2000)
Rolled Lead and three administrative reviews was
Bismuth Carbon Steel consistent with Articles 1.1 (b), 10, 14,




9 Canada-Certain Whether Canada's import duty WT/DS139/R,
Measures Affecting exemption on motor vehicles was WT/DS142/R
the Automotive inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a), 3.1 (b) (Feb. 11, 2000)
Industry, WT/ and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. WT/DS139/AB/
DS139, 142 R,WT/DS142/AB/
R (May 31, 2000)
A number of the decisions are highly controversial in those
countries that lost the cases (e.g., Brazil aircraft, U.S. foreign
sales corporations, and U.S. on the countervailing duty case on
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lead bismuth where the question was whether the sale of a com-
pany for "market value" eliminates subsidies previously re-
ceived). Nonetheless (and subject to the concerns reviewed in
the dispute settlement portion of this Essay), the attention being
paid to subsidy questions is not surprising considering their abil-
ity to distort trade flows.
Currently there are a host of other matters involving poten-
tial subsidy issues that are either under consultation or working
their way through the dispute settlement process.8 6  Conse-
quently, the area will remain highly charged and the subject of
86. See the following list:
List of Pending Cases Involving the SCM Agreement.
Dispute DS No.
1. Brazil-Countervailing Duties on Imports of Desiccated WT/DS30
Coconut and Coconut Milk Powder from Sri Lanka
2. Brazil-Certain Automotive Investment Measures WT/DS51
3. Brazil-Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in WT/DS52
the Automotive Sector
4. Australia-Textile, Clothing and Footwear Import Credit WT/DS57
Scheme
5. Brazil-Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in WT/DS65
the Automotive Sector
6. Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft WT/DS71
7. Brazil-Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in WT/DS81
the Automotive Sector
8. United States-Countervailing Duty Investigation of Imports of WT/DS97
Salmon from Chile
9. European Communities-Measures Affecting the Exportation of WT/DS104
Processed Cheese
10. Peru-Countervailing Duty Investigation Against Imports of WT/DSl12
Buses from Brazil
11. Belgium-Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies WT/DS127
12. Netherlands-Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting WT/DS128
Subsidies
13. Greece-Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies WT/DS129
14. Ireland-Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies WT/DS130
15. France-Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies WT/DS131
16. Argentina-Countervailing Duties on Imports of Wheat Gluten WT/DS145
from the European Communities
17. Japan-Tariff Quotas and Subsidies Affecting Leather WT/DS147
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frequent dispute. That being said, there is no reason (other
than an individual nation's desire to modify adverse rulings) to
reopen the Subsidy and Countervailing Measures Agreement at
this point. Many of the matters that have been litigated have
been outstanding issues of concern to Members for a number of
years.
Countervailing duty laws tend to be used much less fre-
quently than anti-dumping laws due in part to the fact that his-
toric active users (e.g., the United States) have adopted construc-
tions of "actionability" which makes it possible in most cases for
other nations to modify their laws to avoid actionability under
the importing nation's law. It is also due to nations' desires not
to go after practices of trading partners that may be reflected in
their domestic policies as well. The result is far fewer users
(where the 2000 report of the Anti-dumping Committee reports
33 users, the 2000 report of the Subsidies Committee reports 11
users), far fewer initiations in any given year (e.g., twenty coun-
tervailing duty investigations in the period between July 1, 1999
andJune 30, 2000 versus 221 dumping investigation in the same
period), and far fewer measures in effect on June 30, 2000
18. United States-Countervailing Duty Investigation with respect WT/DS167
to Live Cattle from Canada
19. EC-Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight WT/DS172
Management System
20. France-Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight WT/DS173
Management System
21. United States-Measures Treating Export Restraints as WT/DS194
Subsidies
22. United States-Measures Treating Export Restraints as WT/DS194
Subsidies
23. Philippines-Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the WTr]/DS195
Motor Vehicle Sector
24. United States-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on WT/DS206
Steel Plate from India
25. United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain WT/DS212
Products from the European Communities
26. United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion- WT/DS213
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany
For a full review of the first six years of the WTO's dispute settlement system with a
focus on disputes concerning trade remedies (i.e., anti-dumping duties, countervailing
duties, safeguards), see TERENCE P. STEWART & Amy S. DWYER, HANDBOOK ON WTO
TRADE REMEDY DISPUTES: THE FiRST Six YEARs (1995-2000), (forthcoming 2001).
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(ninety-five countervailing duty measures versus 1141 anti-dump-
ing duty measures, with a number of countries not reporting
measures outstanding on dumping).87
Similarly, countervailing duty measures in effect are largely
limited to steel and certain agriculture products, as the following
table reviews:
Definitive Countervailing Duties in Force (As ofJune 30, 2000)
Argentina 3 agricultural products from the EU
Australia 5 agricultural products from member nations of the EU
Brazil 6 agricultural products (5 on powdered coconut and one on coconut
milk (Cote d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka)
Canada 7 measures, of which 3 on agricultural products from the EU or its
Members, three on steel mill products (India, Indonesia, Thailand) and
one on memorials from India
EU 12 measures, of which 1 on agricultural products from Norway, 5 on
steel mill products (India, Taiwan), 3 on synthetic polyester fibres
(Australia, Indonesia and Taiwan) and three miscellaneous (India and
Taiwan)
Mexico 2 agricultural products from the EU or member nations of the EU
United States 46 measures, of which 31 on steel mill products (EU nations, Brazil,
Canada, India, Mexico, South Africa, Korea, Turkey), 6 on agricultural
products (EU, EU Members, Iran, Norway, Turkey), 9 miscellaneous
(Brazil, Canada, EU member nations, Pakistan, Venezuela, Korea,
Taiwan)
Venezuela 3 agricultural products from the EU
New Zealand 2 agricultural products from the EU or member states of the EU
Sources: G/SCM/N/62/ARG (Aug. 11, 2000); G/SCM/N/AUS (July 13, 2000); G/SCM/N/
62/BRA (Aug. 1, 2000); G/SCM/N/CAN (Aug. 29, 2000); G/SCM/N/62/CHL (Sept. 19,
2000); G/SCM/N/EEC (Nov. 9, 2000); G/SCM/N/62/MEX (Sept. 22, 2000); G/SCM/N/
NZL (Aug. 21, 2000); G/SCM/N/62/USA (Sept. 21, 2000); G/SCM/N/VEN (Oct. 30,
2000); G/SCM/N/62/ZAF (Sept. 25, 2000).
The focus of activities within the WTO in the near future
should be on the improvement of the notification process, in-
cluding prioritizing work with significant trading nation Mem-
bers who have not provided the 1998 "new and full" notification.
For many of the other nations who have not provided notifica-
tions, technical assistance may be required and should be made
available on an export trade volume basis or some other means
that will give as complete a picture as early as possible.
87. Compare Report (2000) of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
G/L/408 (Nov. 10, 2000), with Report (2000) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,
G/L/404 at 15-18 (Nov. 8, 2000).
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III. RULES TO BE ADDED
A. Perishable Agriculture
The Uruguay Round negotiations were notable in part be-
cause they established some disciplines on agricultural subsidies,
an agreement to eliminate many non-tariff barriers, minimum
market access commitments and the first steps in tariff liberaliza-
tion. From the beginning the difficulties with the treatment of
agricultural trade on a comprehensive basis were clear. Food se-
curity, the portion of the population in many countries still en-
gaged in agriculture, the peculiarities of agriculture (price vola-
tility, perishability, and seasonality), past experience with
drought, armed-conflict and resulting human suffering, tremen-
dous disparity in the ability of national governments to subsidize
export and domestic production all led to extraordinarily diffi-
cult negotiations. Farmers took to the streets in many countries
to demonstrate their concerns, some Agricultural Ministers re-
signed based on liberalization ultimately agreed to, countries
which historically have benefited from liberalization in trade of
manufactured goods found themselves needing special breaks
for critical agricultural products-typically including dairy in the
West and rice in the East-with duties rising after tariffication of
then existing non-tariff measures in some countries to a breath-
taking level, some as high as 600%! The Agreement on Agricul-
ture that finally emerged recognized that the initial accomplish-
ments were only the first step in agricultural trade liberalization.
Hence, Article 20 of the agreement calls for "Continuation of
the Reform Process:"
Recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial pro-
gressive reductions in support and protection resulting in
fundamental reform is an ongoing process, Members agree
that negotiations for continuing the process will be initiated
one year before the end of the implementation period, taking
into account:
(a) the experience to that date from implementing the
reduction commitments;
(b) the effects of the reduction commitments on world
trade in agriculture;
(c) non-trade concerns, special and differential treat-
ment to developing country Members, and the ob-
jective to establish a fair and market-oriented agri-
cultural trading system, and the other objectives and
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concerns mentioned in the preamble to this Agree-
ment; and
(d) what further commitments are necessary to achieve
the above mentioned long-term objectives. 88
Thus, agriculture is one of the major areas where there has been
a built-in agenda for further liberalization.
To date, the second phase of liberalization negotiations,
which started in 2000, focuses on both the breadth and speed of
future liberalization and the extent to which non-trade concerns
should be addressed. Little attention is spent, however, on the
question of whether existing rules should be modified or ex-
panded in order to address the special nature of agricultural
trade, including places where perishability and seasonality of
production are major issues.
Agricultural producers at the farm level continue to be
characterized, by and large, as highly fragmented in most econo-
mies, suggesting that farmers typically have limited negotiating
clout in selling their product. Unlike manufactured goods,
these producers typically have limited control over the volume of
product produced other than the decision on how much acre-
age to plant and what type of product to grow. Weather can
have an overwhelming effect on actual production in any given
year-drought and major storms can greatly diminish produc-
tion volumes while good weather can result in bumper crops.
Moreover, for many agricultural products, the farmer has
limited ability to hold the product in inventory in an effort to
even out offerings in the market and to prevent price collapses.
Fruits and vegetables are good examples of farm products that
must be sold within a very short window of time or they perish
and become unmarketable. Similarly, cattle have a relatively
short window of time in which to be sold before the returns on
the product drop sharply due to the additional cost of feed, or
conversely reduction in weight gain and the consequent dimin-
ished returns from the purchasers. Thus, large parts of agricul-
ture in many countries can be characterized as subject to tre-
mendous volatility in prices, often regardless of the actions of
the producers.
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission de-
scribes the condition of price volatility that characterizes agricul-
88. Agreement on Agriculture art. 20.
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tural markets, especially for seasonal and perishable products, as
follows:
Agricultural prices are structurally prone to fluctuations be-
cause of the short-run inelasticities of supply and demand for
agricultural products. Production of an agricultural com-
modity, for the most part, is fixed in the short run and is
highly dependent on growing conditions, which can vary
greatly from one year to the next. This can create periods of
under or over supply. Similarly, the demand for basic com-
modities tends to be stable and generally is more responsive
to changes in income and taste than to changes in price. In
this situation, a small shift in supply or demand conditions
can have a major impact on market prices. As a result of
these price swings, farm incomes can be highly variable from
one year to the next.
In addition, the supply of agricultural commodities within
any one crop year or production cycle is seasonal in nature.
Crops are abundant at harvest, and supplies fall during the re-
mainder of the market year. Animal production, though more
continuous, is also predisposed to production cycles due to
animal birth rates and feeding schedules. Demand for most raw
agricultural commodities, however, is steady throughout the
year. This contrast can give rise to seasonal cycles of low prices
at harvest or production peaks, followed by higher prices as
stocks are drawn down.8
9
A specific example of price volatility is demonstrated in the
following table. It shows prices received by U.S. farmers for to-
matoes for fresh market, monthly for 1996. The data presented
demonstrate the volatility in prices, which is typical of all perisha-
ble agricultural products. The price volatility shown would be
even greater if prices were examined on a daily basis.
89. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Division of Economic Analysis,
Policy Alternatives Relating to Agicultural Trade Options and Other Agricultural Risk-Shifting
Contracts, (May 13, 1997), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ag/ag8.htm.
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Source: "Agricultural Prices 1997 Summary"
USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service
(July 1998).
Over time, individual governments have had various ways of
reacting to the swings in profitability that affect farmers and
ranchers, including such measures as (a) large economic trans-
fers (though often in the form of loans), (b) establishment of
minimum prices, (c) enactment of laws to permit producers to
control production volumes to some extent through grade and
other measures, and (d) laws to waive antitrust concerns when
farmers band together in cooperatives or other forms to market
their product collectively.9' Presently, there are no multilateral
90. The United States provides special rules that partially protect certain fruit and,
vegetable growers from wide price fluctuations in the market. The Agricultural Market-
ing Agreement Act ("AMAA") of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., authorizes the Secretary
of Agriculture to establish marketing orders and agreements. While marketing agree-
ments and marketing orders are similar, the Secretary of Agriculture is an actual party
to marketing agreements, which he or she enters into with processors and producers of
agricultural commodities. See id. at 7 U.S.C. § 608b(a). Marketing orders are more
common than marketing agreements; they are issued by the Secretary of Agriculture
and apply to "processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling
of any agricultural commodity." Id. at 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1).
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, marketing orders and marketing
agreements are intended "to help stabilize market conditions for fruit and vegetable
products." See Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, What are
Marketing Orders and How Do They Operate?, at http://www.ams.usda.gov/fv/
moview.html. These programs let farmers act collectively to address problems they face
in the market. Id. At present, some 36 active marketing agreements and marketing
orders exist. Id.
The AMAA, at § 608c(6), provides several regulatory controls that, by setting cer-
tain conditions for the sale of fruits and vegetables, promote price stability. These
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rules addressing these same concerns, nor even plurilateral rules
in most regional agreements such as NAFTA.
At the same time, many farmers are subject to seasonality
limitations that make the traditional notion of a domestic indus-
try or regional industry under existing multilateral rules, at least,
questionable. For example, in a large country like the United
States, production of fresh vegetables during the winter months
is concentrated in Florida. Producers in that part of the United
States do not compete with producers of the same product dur-
ing the summer or fall where production occurs in other parts of
the United States. The same is true in Mexico where the Sinaloa
region produces in much the same time period as Florida, while
Baja has production in a different time frame. For these prod-
ucts, regional considerations under the anti-dumping agreement
are not applicable because the products can be, and are,
shipped long distances. Yet, because of perishability, the health
of regional producers may very well depend on imports from a
mechanisms of marketing orders and marketing agreements include limiting or allot-
ting the quantity of an agricultural commodity that can be marketed; limiting the size,
grade, or quality of products that can be sold; and providing for the control and disposi-
tion of surpluses and the creation of reserve pools. See 7 U.S.C. §608c(6) (A)-(E). Im-
ported fruits and vegetables are required to meet the same grade, size, quality, or ma-
turity standards as domestically produced commodities covered by marketing orders.
See id. at § 608e-1.
The AMAA does not explicitly permit the establishment of minimum prices for
fruits and vegetables. However, recognizing that the AMAA "was devised as a means for
combating chronic fluctuation of prices due to overproduction of certain commodi-
ties," courts have permitted the setting of minimum prices under marketing orders
when disposing of reserve commodities. Prune Bargaining Ass'n v. Butz, 444 F. Supp.
785, 793 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affid, 571 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Cal-Almond,
Inc., v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1993). Importantly, the AMAA grants
an antitrust exemption for activities conducted under a marketing agreement. See 7
U.S.C. § 608b. While § 608b mentions only marketing agreements, and not marketing
orders, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the antitrust exemption applies to both.
See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 201-02 (1939). Federal appeals courts
have assumed the same. See Chiglades Farm, Ltd. v. Butz, 485 F.2d 1125, 1134-35 (5th
Cir. 1973); Wileman Bros. & Elliot v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332, 334-35 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92, like the AMAA, provides a mecha-
nism for fruit and vegetable growers to stabilize prices in the market. Similar to the
AMAA, the Capper-Volstead Act provides a limited exception for agricultural coopera-
tives from antitrust laws. In Northern California Supermarkets, Inc. v. Central California Let-
tuce Producers Cocperative, 413 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.
1978), the Court held that a cooperative's policy of fixing vegetable prices was pro-
tected by the antitrust exemption of the Act. The Capper-Volstead Act does not men-
tion the treatment of imported commodities.
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particular region of a foreign country during the period when
production is occurring.
Moreover, with price volatility and short production periods
available to farmers, there is a compelling need for rules that
permit a correction of a market problem quickly. Safeguard ac-
tions under the Agreement on Safeguards are not timely for the
needs of many sectors within agriculture. While Article 5 of the
Agreement on Agriculture provides for special safeguard provi-
sions for a small subset of agricultural products, and paragraph 6
recognizes perishable and seasonal considerations, Article 5 is
not available on all products from all countries or to a uniform
subset of products whose characteristics would make Article 5 a
potentially appropriate rule.9
There is also some effort to address the special needs of per-
ishable goods within the WTO's Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"). At
the consultations stage, in cases of urgency (which include those
concerning perishable goods), Members are required to enter
into consultations within ten days of the receipt of the request.
If the consultations fail to settle the dispute within twenty days of
the receipt of the request, the complaining party may request
the establishment of a panel.92 Additionally, in urgent cases, in-
cluding those concerning perishable goods, the parties to the
dispute, the panel, and the Appellate Body should make every
effort to accelerate the resolution of the dispute.93 Under the
panel's procedures, in urgent cases (which include those involv-
ing perishable goods), panels are urged to expedite their proce-
dures and issue their report to the parties within three months
instead of the usual of six months.94 Although the Appellate
Body is urged to accelerate the resolution of the dispute, no
timeframe is suggested for issuing their report in cases of ur-
gency (which include perishable products). While these provi-
sions are potentially helpful, countries have been frustrated in
their use, and the timeline of even expedited DSU proceedings
offers little actual help to producers facing a problem today.
The above comments reflect an existing opportunity for the
91. See Agreement on Safeguards art. 5.
92. See DSU art. 4.
93. See id.
94. See id.
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trading system to improve support within agriculture for ex-
panded liberalization-the opportunity to review the need for
and negotiate rules within the Agreement on Agriculture, which
will address the special needs of agricultural producers because
of perishability and seasonality. Without such special rules,
trade liberalization will tend to exacerbate divisions within na-
tions on the need for and wisdom of expanding trade opportuni-
ties in agricultural products. In the United States, for example,
as part of NAFTA, U.S. vegetable producers were promised tools
to address surges in imports. The mechanism provided has
proven unusable for domestic producers, undermining these
producers' support for further liberalization within the WTO or
within the hemisphere.
Interestingly, there has been significant interest in address-
ing some or all of these issues by various governmental and pri-
vate sector groups, although no nation has yet put the issues
onto the negotiating table in Geneva. A review of some of the
views within the United States, Mexico, and Canada follows.
1. U.S. Proposals For Treatment of Perishable Products
Since the Uruguay Round, various organizations have rec-
ommended the development of special trade rules for perisha-
ble and seasonal products. In the past three years, the American
Farm Bureau Federation has testified several times before Con-
gress. On at least three of these occasions, the American Farm
Bureau has repeated its recommendation to modify DSU provi-
sions involving perishable products.95 The American Farm Bu-
reau has suggested that the dispute settlement process for per-
ishable agricultural products should be modified so as to allow
the procedure to be used where only the aggrieved party pro-
poses its use. Under the current system, the WTO requires both
parties to a dispute to agree to use the perishable-products pro-
95. See United State Negotiating Objectives for the WJ'O Seattle Ministerial Meeting Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) (state-
ment of Dean Kieckner, President, American Farm Bureau Federation); see also The
Administration's Preparations for the 1999 World Trade Organization Ministerial: Before the
House Comm. on Agric., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Al Christopherson, President,
Minnesota Farm Bureau, on behalf of American Farm Bureau Federation); Implementa-
tion of Fast Track Authority: Before the Sucomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Bob Rice, President, California Farm Bureau
on behalf of American Farm Bureau Federation).
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cedure.96 The American Farm Bureau believes that promptly en-
acting this change would address the fundamental problem of a
dispute settlement process that requires too much time and pre-
vents market access for several marketing seasons before a reso-
lution is reached.97 For its part, the Seattle Round Agricultural
Committee98 articulated a similar concern when it recom-
mended that negotiators accelerate resolution of agricultural
trade disputes. 9 Although it did not provide the negotiators
with specifics, one source did point out that the requirement
that both sides must agree to use an expedited schedule should
be reworked to mandate an expedited schedule.' 00
Various state government officials also have testified before
Congress on the need for special rules for perishable agricul-
ture. The State of Florida, for instance, has urged that the
United States support reform of the Agriculture Agreement to
address effectively the problem of price volatility in perishable
agricultural commodities.
Issues important to seasonal and perishable or specialty agri-
culture were not fully addressed during the last round of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations. We have requested that these is-
sues be addressed on the agenda in the upcoming Ministerial
Round. We must have some mechanism to address price col-
lapses in perishable commodities. We desire specific rules to
deal with seasonal and perishable agricultural products, as
well as enforcement of scientifically based sanitary and
phytosanitary issues, workable and timely safeguard mecha-
nisms, rapid dispute settlement resolutions, open market ac-
cess, and elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.
96. See United State Negotiating Objectives for the WrO Seattle Ministerial Meeting. Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) (state-
ment of Dean Kleckner, President, American Farm Bureau Federation).
97. See id.
98. The Seattle Round Agricultural Committee ("SRAC") is a coalition of more
than seventy U.S.-based commodity groups and associations representing agricultural
producers, processors and agribusinesses. Its goal is to demonstrate U.S. agricultural
and food sector support for the launching of a comprehensive round of multilateral
trade negotiations and the need for free and fair trade in agricultural commodities and
products. See Agriculture Coalition Sets Priorities for WTO, Sidesteps Radical Reform, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, May 21, 1999 [hereinafter Agricultural Coalition].
99. See id. The National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (or
"NASDA") has also endorsed a change in international trade rules for perishable goods.
See Policy Statement, NASDA, International Marketing and Trade of Agricultural Prod-
ucts (Sept. 26, 2000).
100. See Agriculture Coalition, supra note 96.
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We, along with other states with similar interests, pledge to
work with USTR, USDA and our Congressional Delegation to
affect policy matters both in the international WTO Ministe-
rial negotiations and to forge needed changes in domestic
law to gain a conducive situation to trade in out agricultural
products.
No specific rules exist to deal with general trade or dispute
resolution involving perishable and seasonal commodities.
The former head of the Uruguay Round agriculture negotiat-
ing team when asked, at the AG Forum immediately preced-
ing the FTAA Business Forum in Belo Horizonte, if specific
rules for perishable commodities were needed, agreed that
specific rules could be helpful and may be advisable. Florida
has sought recognition that trade remedies should be availa-
ble on perishable and seasonal agricultural products that re-
flect the commercial realities of these products. The Agree-
ment on Agriculture already recognizes the need for separate
treatment or timelines. We request that the U.S. consider ad-
ding discussion of the need for rules for perishable and sea-
sonal commodities as an item on the agenda for the upcom-
ing ministerial in Seattle. Similarly, the U.S. should include
in the negotiations consideration of what, if any, special rules
may be needed to cope with commodity price collapses such
as have been experienced in livestock and grain." 0 '
101. United State Negotiating Objectives for the WJ'O Seattle Ministerial Meeting . Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) (state-
ment of Bob Crawford, Commissioner of Agriculture).
In addition, in comments submitted to the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Florida
suggested specific reforms that would help to address the needs of perishable and sea-
sonal agricultural products:
Florida's agricultural industry has been deeply disappointed in the inability of
existing U.S. trade laws and international agreements to address the needs of
perishable and seasonal products. While Article 5 of the Agriculture Agree-
ment recognizes both perishable and seasonal products in the context of the
Special Safeguards Provisions, there is nothing in the Agriculture Agreement
which otherwise defines the issues or identifies rights and obligations with re-
gard to these products. One such right should be that for purposes of rules
based actions (anti-dumping, countervailing duty, safeguard), a seasonal prod-
uct can be a separate industry to the extent that relief is provided for only that
season. This change could arguably be accomplished within the Agriculture
Agreement or could be included in each of the other Agreements in the in-
dustry definition section. Similarly, the nature of perishable agricultural prod-
ucts is such that price volatility is extreme and consumers are not benefited by
the gyrations in price and volume from the farms. Consideration of ap-
proaches that can permit producers across borders to better stabilize supply
and maintain sustainable pricing should be pursued. One such approach
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Similarly, on behalf of the State of Arizona, the Director of
the Arizona Department of Agriculture has testified that the cur-
rent avenues for dispute resolution in the WTO inadequately
suit the needs of producers of perishable and seasonable com-
modities because the very nature of such commodities requires
trade mechanisms that provide timely solutions. 10 2 He noted
that special rules are necessary to ensure that perishable ship-
ments are not lost due to bureaucratic or political mecha-
nisms. 103 The Arizona Department of Agriculture also suggested
that in the new round of negotiations, the United States should
seek clarification of the dispute settlement process with the goal
of a strong enforcement mechanism, limited settlement appeals,
and strict compliance deadlines.'0 4
Representative Karen Thurman (D-Fla.) also, in testimony
before the Subcommittee on Trade, has spoken of the many
unique considerations that perishable agricultural products face,
pointing out that products such as tomatoes, oranges, and pep-
pers cannot be stored until markets change or trade disputes get
resolved. 10 5 Representative Thurman concluded that interna-
tional trading rules need to be developed to address the special
concerns of producers of seasonal and perishable agricultural
commodities. 10 6
2. International Proposals for Perishable Products
U.S. agricultural organizations and committees are not the
only parties for whom changes to the WTO rules for perishable
products would be beneficial; indeed, such reforms would bene-
fit all WTO Members. 10 7 One specific example of international
could be a clarification that Art. 11.1 (b) note 4 of the Safeguard Agreement
does not apply in the case of agricultural agreements between countries.
Submission of Bob Crawford, Commissioner of Agriculture, State of Florida, Comments
of the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDA CS) Regarding U.S. Prepa-
rations for the World Trade Organization's Ministerial Meeting, at 8 (Oct. 16, 1998).
102. See United State Negotiating Objectives for the WfO Seattle Ministerial Meeting.
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Sheldon R. Jones, Director, Arizona Department of Agriculture).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See US. Efforts to Reduce Barriers to Trade in Agriculture: Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Rep.
Karen Thurman).
106. See id.
107. For example, Sheldon Jones, the Director of the Arizona Department of Agri-
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cooperation in addressing the problem of perishable agricul-
tural products is seen in the meeting, in 1999, of representatives
from State Agricultural Commissions of the United States, Ca-
nada, and Mexico to develop common positions for future WTO
negotiations. That meeting produced the 1999 State-Provinces
Agricultural Accord. °8 These countries agreed that agriculture
should be given the highest priority for the new round of negoti-
ations because failure to resolve difficult agricultural issues
would be detrimental to future growth and prosperity in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico." °' In addition, the repre-
sentatives provided recommendations for a common negotiating
strategy, including a statement urging the creation of specific
rules and processes for trade in perishable and seasonable prod-
ucts that address the unique nature of these products.110
3. Conclusion
As part of the Agreement on Agriculture, Members agreed
to initiate negotiations for continuing the agricultural trade re-
form process one year before the end of the implementation pe-
riod (i.e., by the end of 1999)."' Those negotiations have now
begun and, to date, a great deal of work has been undertaken to
identify potential issues affecting, approaches to, and concerns
with, further trade liberalization in agriculture.
If trade expansion in agriculture is to continue, it is critical
culture, in testimony before the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means
Committee, noted:
Presently, no specific rules exist to deal with the trade of perishable and sea-
sonal commodities. When asked if specific rules for perishable commodities
were needed at the Ag Forum immediately preceding the Free Trade Area of
the Americas Business Forum in Belo Horizonte, the head of the Uruguay
Round agriculture negotiating team agreed that the promulgation of such
rules would be both helpful and advisable for all WTO member countries.
United State Negotiating Objectives for the WTO Seattle Ministerial Meeting. Before the Subcomm.
on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Shel-
don R. Jones, Director, Arizona Department of Agriculture) (emphasis added).
108. See Letter from Cary Peterson, President, National Association of State De-
partments of Agriculture, Jaime Rodriguez Lopez, Mexican Association of State Depart-
ments of Agriculture Development, and Eric Upsall, Chair, Provincial Ministers of Ca-
nada (July 17, 1999) (on file with authors).
109. See id.
110. See id. These issues can be addressed within NAFTA or other regional ar-
rangements in part through expanding marketing orders and Capper-Volstead rights to
international producers and having similar legislation in the other NAFTA countries.
111. See Agreement on Agriculture art. 20.
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that the trading system come to grips with the peculiarities of the
sector and adopt rules that will permit the peculiarities to be
addressed in a mutually-agreed manner. The ongoing negotia-
tions on agriculture are an important opportunity. Member na-
tions should be sure the opportunity is not lost.
B. Structural Excess Capacity
The multilateral trading system's rules typically address
problems of one country or, at least, one product at a time.
Thus, anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions are brought
against imports of a particular product from a particular coun-
try. Safeguard actions are brought against particular products
imported from all trading partners. Violations of market access
rights are brought against specific products. In most circum-
stances, the existing WTO rules (other than in the agricultural
area) work reasonably well and are typically used infrequently.
There are, however, situations where the international trad-
ing system is confronted by an international problem that is af-
fecting many Member nations simultaneously. Extraordinary
events like the collapse of the former Soviet Union resulted in a
massive global imbalance between supply and demand in a num-
ber of sectors, an imbalance which has not corrected itself in
some sectors despite the nearly ten years, that have passed since
the original collapse in demand. Because the former Soviet
Union controlled a large share of international production re-
sources in various'ifidu)stries and because demand declined
precipitously for manyl of 'the'se products within the successor
states, there have been worldwide dislocations that have led to a
wide variety of efforts at the local level to address the fallout in
national markets.
In some industries, such as steel, the structural problems
that developed as a result of the Soviet Union's collapse com-
pounded structural excess capacity that had existed for long pe-
riods because of national security, job maintenance and other
reasons, and which was largely maintained by massive govern-
ment subsidies. In recent years, these structural problems were
similarly exacerbated by the unusual financial crisis in certain
parts of Asia, which seriously decreased demand in important
markets of the world.
In one sector, aluminum, there was an ad hoc plurilateral
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effort to address the glut of aluminum production in light of
drastically-contracted demand following certain individual na-
tion efforts to address the staggering overproduction. In the EC,
quotas were imposed on imports from Russia in 1993.112 The
United States sought comments on how to address the situation
(amidst indications that the domestic industry was likely to file
an anti-dumping case). 1  Finally, six countries reportedly en-
tered a Memorandum of Understanding, which attempted to ad-
dress the problem on a global basis with reported production
cut backs and other actions.114 The ad hoc solution was success-
ful in restoring a better balance between supply and demand but
raised a variety of concerns under national antitrust laws in, at
least, some countries.
The ongoing crisis in the steel sector is a good example of
why the WTO should consider adding rules that would permit
structural excess capacity to be taken out of the system quickly
and according to internationally-agreed rules. The existing
tools, which are micro-economic in application, do not address
the underlying problem of massive excess capacity in an efficient
manner. Producers and consumers alike would be served by
providing multilateral solutions to these extraordinary problems.
1. Steel Industry as a Case Study
Many countries believe that a strong domestic steel industry
is essential because of its use in a variety of industries. Steel is a
major component in automobiles, building construction, major
appliances, national defense and other sectors. Historically,
countries have wanted to have a steel industry, both for employ-
ment reasons and as a resource in time of armed conflict. Thus,
it has been common for many nations too small to economically
justify the maintenance of steel facilities to nonetheless have
steel capacity. Moreover, the large integrated steel mills of the
past have been major employers, often in fairly isolated areas of
nations with few alternative employment opportunities. In times
of economic downturn for the sector, the contraction in de-
112. See Commission Regulation No. 227/93, O.J.L 198/21 (1993).
113. See Request for Public Comment on Strategies To Address Increased Exports
of Primary Aluminum From Newly Independent States, 58 Fed. Reg. 50,061 (Sept. 24,
1993).
114. See Don't Call it a Cartel, But World Aluminum Has Forged New Order, WALL ST. J.,
June 9, 1994, at 1.
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mand has proven economically unaffordable for the steel mills
of countries, either from an employment or profitability basis.
This has resulted, over time, in periodic waves of export surges at
depressed prices. It has also resulted in many nations being un-
willing to let capacity be eliminated for one or more of the rea-
sons reviewed previously. Hence, many nations have funneled
billions of dollars into their steel mills to prevent their collapse.
Add to this the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the succes-
sor states' need for hard currency, the financial crisis in Asia
(and elsewhere) amongst countries with significant steel produc-
tion capacity, and the last few years have seen an unprecedented
array of trade cases brought against imported steel from other
countries.
a. Structural Imbalances in the Steel Industry: 1970s and 1980s
Serious excess capacity has existed in the global steel indus-
try for some thirty years or more, certainly since the first oil crisis
in 1974 when demand decreased sharply.' The decline of the
steel industry continued throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.
A combination of factors was responsible for this decline, includ-
ing a severe economic recession in the 1980s, fundamental
changes in steel consumption patterns due to technological ad-
vances, intra-industry competition, and an increase in imports.'
1 6
Many governments, viewing the decrease in demand as a trough
in the cyclical nature of the industry, continued production and
often expanded their operations.
117
Moreover, governments in developing countries added to
this excess capacity by investing in new government-sponsored
steel producers. 1 8 This capacity expansion resulted in a tripling
of capacity levels in developing countries between 1970 and
115. See Thomas R. Howell, Brent L. Bartlett, TI-E NEW CRISIS IN STEEL, Statement
Before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, Washington, D.C., at 7
(Feb. 25, 1999).
116. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 822; see also Thomas R. Howell, Brent L.
Bartlett, THE NEW CRISIS IN STEEL, supra note 113, at 7-8. With demand still flat, the
combination of new mills and expansion of the old mills caused excess production
capacity to reach 120 million tons by the early 1980s. Id.
117. For example, during this time, Europe doubled its output, and, between 1960
and 1975, Japan experienced a sevenfold increase in capacity. See UR TREATISE, supra
note 1, at 822.
118. See THOMAS R. HOWELL, ET AL. STEEL AND THE STATE: GOVERNMENT INTERVEN-
TION AND STEEL'S STRUCTURAL CRISIS 252-54 (1998).
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1986, at which point steelmaking capacity in developing coun-
tries reached 122 million metric tons." 9 During this period,
many governments intervened in their steel industry to prevent a
decrease in employment or production despite stagnant or de-
clining demand in certain markets, exacerbating the imbalance
between global demand and supply.
b. Collapse of Demand in the Former Soviet Union
During the 1980s, the Soviet Union had one of the largest
minerals and metals sectors in the world. 120 The metals and
minerals sector accounted for about 25% of exports and em-
ployed more than 1.5 million people. 121 With the sudden
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the multilateral trading
system experienced a tremendous change in the supply and de-
mand equation for these minerals and metals. This change in
supply and demand resulted in Russian producers exporting a
variety of metals and minerals at distressed prices as the collapse
in demand within the successor states and the need for hard cur-
rency led to contracts being set at virtually any price, typically far
below other exporting nations.
What was true for the metals and minerals sector generally
was especially true for steel. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union
was one the world's largest steel producers, with its military ab-
sorbing a large percentage of production. So heavy was the in-
ternal demand for steel within the Soviet Union that the country
was a net importer prior to 1991. After the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, Russia inherited most of its steel facilities. As was
true in some other nations as well, steelmaking facilities had
served as major employers of people. The location of facilities
often made the region heavily dependent for employment upon
the continuation of activity at the steelmaking facility. This situa-
tion made it difficult for the Russian Federation to permit the
type of layoffs and plant closures that might have been expected
based on technology and efficiency levels of many of the facili-
119. See id at 252.
120. See U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMM'N, Pub. No. 3153, Impediments to Competi-
tiveness in Russia's Minerals and Metals Sector, in INDUSTRY TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY RE-
VIEW, at 1 (1998). These minerals and metals included iron ore, steel, bauxite (alumi-
num ore), aluminum, copper ore, zinc, nickel, and gold. See id.
121. See id.
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ties, t 2 2 although there has been some privatization and some
downsizing of the steel industry.1 23 Not only was there a stagger-
ing drop in demand from the Russian military following the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union but demand was collapsing throughout
the former Soviet Union, as were commercial links. 124 Despite
heavy staffing of facilities and drastic reductions in demand, the
Russian government was apprehensive about substantial layoffs
for fear of creating a "huge social explosion.
125
As reported in the press, many Russian facilities were unable
to pay workers for months or paid them in kind. Russian facili-
ties found collecting payments in the internal market to be diffi-
cult and instead focused on exporting to obtain hard currency
or improve the likelihood of being paid at all. Without well-es-
tablished outlets in the West for their products, Russian produc-
ers often sold through sales agents focused on moving product
at any price. The result was that Russia exported record
amounts of steel. 126 Whereas the Soviet Union was a net im-
porter of steel, Russia was exporting 65% of its output by mid-
1998.127
c. The Current Situation
The U.S. government recently described the excess capacity
situation in the global steel industry as follows:
Overcapacity is a relative term, and there is no single agreed-
upon definition. Generally, the term is used to describe the
fact that global steelmaking capacity has been consistently
well-above global steel production over the long term. In the
case of steel, this may be attributable to the fact that less than
perfect market forces dominate the industry, such that gov-
ernment supports and other activities have sustained uneco-
122. See id.
123. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION,
Report to the President: Global Steel Trade, Structural Problems and Future Solutions 37 (July
2000).
124. See U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMM'N, supra note 118.
125. See Thomas R. Howell, Brent L. Bartlett, THE NEW CRISIS IN STEEL, supra note
113 at 21.
126. See U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Re-
port to the President: Global Steel Trade, Structural Problems and Future Solutions at 40 (July
2000).
127. See Thomas R. Howell, Brent L. Bartlett, THE NEW CRISIS IN STEEL, supra note
113, at 23. Moreover, some Russian steel mills were actually exporting almost 100% of
their production, at prices well below those prevailing in foreign markets. See id.
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nomic capacity and production. Although there may be dif-
ferent ways to measure global steelmaking capacity and pro-
duction, most industry experts that have analyzed the issue
find a sizeable and consistent gap between capacity and pro-
duction over the long term.
A 1999 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) report concludes that world steelmaking ca-
pacity has remained well-above production between 1985 and
1999. The report states that world steelmaking capacity in-
creased by almost 150 million metric tons (MT) during this
time and that by 2001 it will have increased by an additional
45 million MT. However, steel production has increased in
"distinctly smaller proportions," resulting in a widening gap
between production and capacity. (Efforts are currently
under way in the OECD Steel Committee to refine the capac-
ity measurement pursuant to questions raised as to the accu-
racy of some of the underlying country capacity data.)
Most other steel analysts have also concluded that there is sig-
nificant overcapacity in the global steel industry. A World
Steel Dynamics study of capacity utilization rates reached con-
clusions very similar to those of the OECD. Moreover, the
London-based Iron and Steel Statistics Bureau (ISSB) esti-
mated world excess capacity to be 250 and 275 million MT in
1997 and 1998, respectively.
Comparable findings of overcapacity have been made for spe-
cific regions and countries. The ISSB calculated 100 million
MT of overcapacity in Eastern Europe and countries of the
former Soviet Union, 70 million MT in Asia, 50 million MT in
the European Union (mainly in Italy and Spain), and 15 mil-
lion MT in the United States. The United Nations estimated
that overcapacity in Russia and the Ukraine was between 20
and 30 million MT. Analyzing the Japanese steel industry, a
1999 report by a committee sponsored by the Ministry of In-
ternational Trade and Industry, which took into account do-
mestic and global demand over the long term, estimated that
fifteen percent of Japanese steelmaking capacity, about 17
million MT, was "surplus." Finally, one of the conclusions
reached by a recent International Monetary Fund report was
that "excess production capacity" had been created in the Ko-
rean steel industry as a result of government influenced pri-
vate investment (although the report did not explain how this
conclusion was reached). While estimates from various
sources indicate that there is substantial unused steelmaking
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capacity throughout the world as a whole across many years,
high fixed costs and other factors (including, for example,
protected markets and subsidies) encourage steel makers to
operate facilities at high levels of capacity. Such high capacity
utilization, combined with substantial unused capacity over-
hand, tends to suppress prices world wide.
1 28
d. Response of the United States to the Problem of
Excess Capacity
With the global excess capacity resulting in wave after wave
of distress pricing of imported product into the U.S. market-
place, U.S. producers lost the ability to supply the U.S. market.
Indeed, the United States became the only major producing na-
tion with a substantial trade deficit on steel mill products. As a
very open and large market, the United States is frequently the
destination of choice -for excess capacity in other countries.
Problems in the early 1970s and a wave of anti-dumping
cases led to the creation of the Trigger Price Mechanism (or
"TPM"). The TPM was designed to let the U.S. government self-
initiate cases where prices of imports were below the full costs of
the most efficient producers at the time (the Japanese steel com-
panies) .129 In exchange, trade cases were withdrawn or were not
filed by domestic steel producers. The TPM was revised once
but ultimately collapsed in the face of the major global contrac-
tion in the early 1980s.
130
The U.S. producers filed a large number of steel cases in
1982 and selected cases thereafter and pursued an escape clause
case in 1984 on all carbon and alloy steel mill products. The
European Union, one of the major targets of the U.S. anti-
128. See U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, supra
note 124, at 3.
129. See, e.g., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, Pub. No. 1021, Operation of the Trade Agree-
ments Program, in 30TH REPORT-1978, at 11 (1979). "In late 1977 the Department of the
Treasury announced that it would inaugurate a trigger-price mechanism (TPM) for use
in monitoring the prices of imports of steel mill products .... The TPM was designed
to enable the U.S. Customs Service to initiate anti-dumping investigations on a "fast-
track" basis without waiting for receipt of complaints. The purpose is to alert Customs
to the possibility of sales at less than fair value." Id.
130. "On January 11, 1982, in response to seven domestic steel producers' filing
anti-dumping and/or countervailing duty petitions covering many steel mill products
from nine countries, Commerce suspended the TPM." U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, Pub.
No. 1414, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, in 34TH REPORT-1982, at 240
(1983).
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dumping and countervailing duty actions in 1982, preferred vol-
untary restraints to prevent serious internal dislocations than
having the trade cases run their course. Similarly, although
large segments of the US steel industry obtained affirmative de-
terminations by the U.S. International Trade Commission under
the 1984 safeguard investigation, the President, with support
from Congress, preferred voluntary restraint agreements (or
"VRA") on a broader array of products with many of the major
producers. These VRAs remained in place until 1992, at which
point a large round of new steel cases were filed.
The continuance of the steel crisis of 1998 resulted in an
ever-expanding number of cases, efforts to pass legislation to im-
pose global quotas, a call for a global safeguard action, and a
spate of bankruptcies in the United States. In 2000, the U.S. gov-
ernment, through the U.S. Department of Commerce, con-
ducted a study that resulted in the July 2000 report to the Presi-
dent. The Clinton Administration subsequently announced a
program of affirmative steps.13 ' The steps taken to date, how-
ever, have yet to resolve the U.S. producers' problems, resulting
in calls in early 2001 for emergency actions to deal with increas-
ing bankruptcies and other problems. 13
2
e. Response of the European Community
Following the crisis in 1974,' the European Community es-
tablished a variety of measures to assist its steel industry. At the
beginning of the crisis in 1975, the Member States of the Euro-
pean Community intervened in the steel industry and provided
subsidies to failing producers to prevent a collapse of their steel
industries. 13 In the next few years they began to establish more
comprehensive programs. Between 1978 and 1988, the Euro-
pean Community set up import control measures through nego-
tiation of bilateral agreements with more than twenty coun-
tries.'34 These agreements gave the European Community some
131. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Commerce News (July 26, 2000),
at www.ita.doc.gov/media/STEEL726.htm.
132. See, e.g., Ukraine, U.S. Explore Restraint Agreement On Steel Imports, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 5, 2000 ("The Administration as recently as last week came under blistering
criticism from the domestic industry for its failure to provide import relief, as the LTV
Corporation, a major U.S. operator of integrated mills, filed for bankruptcy Dec. 29.").
Id.
133. See THOMAS R. HOWELL ET AL., supra note 116, at 55.
134. See id. at 95-96.
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time to reorganize its steel industries. Moreover, in 1980, the
European Community declared a state of manifest crisis, im-
posed mandatory production quotas on many steel products,
and fined any company that produced steel in excess of the
quota or undercut the legal minimum price.135 These measures
remained in place until 1988 and were reintroduced in a more
limited way between 1992 and 1994. Such measures helped the
European Community survive the steel crisis of the 1970s and
1980s. As reviewed previously, the EC has seen a spate of trade
cases and has established various bilateral arrangements in the
last decade to deal with the latest crisis caused by excess capacity.
f. Worldwide
The crisis in the steel industry is not limited to the United
States and the European Community. The structural excess ca-
pacity situation is global in scope, affecting producers world-
wide. Virtually all countries are affected by the steel situation in
one form or another. The number of trade cases involving steel
arising over the past few years is illuminating. Consider the fol-
lowing examples:
1. INDIA: In the first half of 2000, India completed a round
of anti-dumping cases on seamless tube from Austria, the
Czech Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, and
the Ukraine, and also had outstanding anti-dumping duty
orders on hot rolled coils from Russia and the
Ukraine.136
2. CANADA: Under the auspices of its countervailing duty
law, Canada investigated stainless steel round bars im-
ported from Brazil and India, and hot-rolled carbon steel
plates from India, Indonesia, and Thailand. 137 Canada
also had a wide variety of investigations, orders or under-
takings in place on various steel mill products from Bra-
zil, Cuba, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Ja-
pan, Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak
Republic, Thailand, Turkey, the Ukraine, the United
States, Venezuela, the People's Republic of China, Tai-
135. See Thomas R. Howell & Brent L. Bartlett, THE NEW CRISIS IN STEEL, supra
note 113, at 35.
136. Committee on Anti-DumpingPratices, Semi-Annual Report and Article 16.4 of the
Agreement-India, G/ADP/N/65/IND (Sept. 19, 2000).
137. Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Semi-Annual Report and
Article 25.11 of the Agreement-Canada, G/SCM/N/62/CAN/Rev.1 (Oct. 24, 2000).
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wan, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Mexico, and the United King-
dom. 13
8
3. VENEZUELA: Venezuela had anti-dumping orders on
seamed and seamless steel tubes and bars and rods of
non-alloy steel from Japan, on seamless steel tubes from
Romania, and on hot-rolled and cold-rolled flat products
from the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and the
Ukraine. 13
9
4. EUROPEAN UNION: The EU had dozens of steel cases, or-
ders and/or undertakings under its anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws on products from Bulgaria, the
People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, India, Iran, Korea, Malaysia, Romania, the Rus-
sian Federation, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the
Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. 140 Also, as shown by the Chart
in Attachment 1, the EU had various bilateral arrange-
ments with various countries.
5. MExico: In the first half of 2000, under its countervailing
duty law, Mexico had undertakings and orders in effect
on various types of steel from Brazil and Venezuela and
anti-dumping duty orders in force on various steel prod-
ucts from Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Kazakhstan,
the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine,
the United States, and Venezuela.'
6. SOUTH AFRICA: South Africa has; anti-dumping orders
outstanding on various steel mill products from Korea,
Malaysia, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine.
142
7. COLOMBIA: Colombia has investigations underway on
hot-rolled sheet from Kazakhstan, the Russian Federa-
tion, and the Ukraine, and orders outstanding on tin
plate from the Netherlands, cold-rolled sheet from Ka-
zakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine, and
bars and rods from the Russian Federation and Trinidad
138. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Canada, G/ADP/N/65/CAN (Aug. 30, 2000).
139. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Venezuela, G/ADP/N/65/VEN (Oct. 25 2000).
140. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-European Communities-Corrigendum, G/ADP/N/65/EEC (Aug.
17, 2000); G/SCM/N/62/EEC (Nov. 9, 2000).
141. Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Semi-Annual Report under
Article 25.11 of the Agreement-Mexico, G/SCM/N/62/MEX (Sept. 22, 2000).
142. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-South Africa, G/ADP/N/65/ZAF (Sept. 22, 2000).
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and Tobago.
143
8. BRAZIL: Brazil had investigations and/or orders on vari-
ous steel mill products from Taiwan, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, and Spain.
144
9. AUSTRALIA: Australia had investigations and/or orders on
certain steel mill products from Thailand and the United
Kingdom. 14
5
10. EGYPT: Egypt had anti-dumping duty orders in effect on
steel reinforcing bars from Latvia, Romania, Turkey, and
the Ukraine.
146
11. INDONESIA: Indonesia had anti-dumping duty orders in
effect on steel pipes from the People's Republic of China,
Japan, Korea, and Singapore, and on hot-rolled coil from
India. 4 7
12. KOREA: Korea had a price undertaking in place with the
Russian Federation on H-beams.
148
13. PERU: Peru had anti-dumping orders in effect on hot and
cold-rolled steels from the Russian Federation and the
Ukraine. 14
9
14. PHILIPPINES: The Philippines conducted an investigation
on steel mill products from Taiwan and Korea.
150
15. SINGAPORE: Singapore imposed an anti-dumping duty or-
der on steel reinforcement bars from Turkey.' 5
1
16. THAILAND: Thailand had anti-dumping duty orders in ef-
fect on H-sections from Korea and Poland.
152
17. TURKEY: Turkey had anti-dumping duty investigations
143. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Colombia, G/ADP/N/65/COL (Sept. 25, 2000).
144. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Brazil, G/ADP/N/65/BRA (Aug. 1, 2000).
145. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Australia, G/ADP/N/65/AUS Ouly 13, 2000).
146. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Egypt, G/ADP/N/65/EGY (Aug. 24 2000).
147. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Indonesia, G/ADP/N/65/IDN (Sept. 1, 2000).
148. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Korea, G/ADP/N/65/KOR (Aug. 3, 2000).
149. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Peru, G/ADP/N/65/PER (Sept. 20, 2000).
150. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Philippines, G/ADP/N/65/PHL (Sept. 21, 2000).
151. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Singapore, G/ADP/N/65/SGP (Aug. 24, 2000).
152. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Thailand, G/ADP/N/65/THA (Aug. 1, 2000).
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and/or orders on steel billets from Moldova, the Russian
Federation, and the Ukraine.
15 3
18. UNITED STATES: The United States had anti-dumping
duty investigations, orders or suspension agreements,
countervailing duty investigations, orders or suspension
agreements and/or safeguard actions on a wide variety of
steel mill products from several countries; these include:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, In-
dia, Italy, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Moldova, Netherlands, the People's Republic of
China, Philippines, Poland, Romania, the Russian Feder-
ation, Singapore, the Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Taiwan, Turkey, the Ukraine,
United Kingdom, and Venezuela.1 54 The U.S. also had a
negotiated arrangement with the Russian Federation on a
full range of products and was, at the beginning of 2001,
in negotiations with the Ukraine for a comprehensive
package. 155
Although not exhaustive, this list demonstrates the extraordinary
problems facing all major steel producing nations due to the se-
rious imbalance between global supply and demand.
2. Global Rules Should Be Established to Deal With Structural
Excess Capacity
Although countries provide temporary measures to respond
to problems such as those experienced globally by the steel in-
dustry, such nations remain unable to effectively resolve the un-
derlying problem of structural excess capacity. In steel, there
has been a nearly continual crisis since the 1970s. The multilat-
eral trading system provides effective procedures to respond to
periodic excess capacity. The experiences of industries suffering
structural excess capacity, such as steel and aluminum, suggest,
however, that the establishment of multilateral rules for restor-
153. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Turkey, G/ADP/N/65/TUR (Aug. 30, 2000).
154. See, e.g., Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Semi-Annual Re-
port under Article 25.11 of the Agreement-United States, G/SCM/N/62/USA (Sept.
21, 2000); Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-United States, G/ADP/N/65/USA (Oct. 6, 2000); Report (2000) of the
Committee on Safeguards, G/L/409 (Nov. 23, 2000).
155. See Ukraine, U.S. Explore Restraint Agreement On Steel Imports, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Jan. 5, 2000.
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ing equilibrium would result in significantly less stress on the sys-
tem, less destruction of economically efficient operations, and a
quicker return to sustainable competition.
It is not the purpose of this Essay to outline what the rules
should be for effectively addressing structural excess capacity.
The WTO would do well to encourage input from as many in-
dustries and Member governments as possible. Such dialogue
would encourage a broader understanding of the range of situa-
tions that excess capacity develops, and the types of rules that
might result in an expeditious and favorable return to normal
WTO situations. Considering the WTO's, World Bank's, and the
IMF's ability to coordinate, any rules addressing global excess
capacity should include opportunities for creative solutions and
coordinated actions in an effort to modernize, and develop in-
frastructure projects reducing the magnitude or timing of capac-
ity reductions. Rules should also include steps leading to a feasi-
ble resolution of the problem on terms acceptable to the world.
Hopefully, Members of the WTO will not miss the opportunity
presented by this current crisis to address this important issue
either within a new Round, or as a separate matter on an expe-
dited basis.
CONCLUSION
The trading system has undergone some dramatic chal-
lenges since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the
launch of the World Trade Organization. By and large, the ex-
isting rules system and the dispute process has been able to ad-
dress many of the stresses in the system. Problems have arisen
from the construction of obligations under Article XIX of GATT
1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards and with certain aspects
of the functioning of the dispute settlement system, that should
be addressed as part of a new Round or separately.
In other major rules areas, such as anti-dumping and subsi-
dies, there is much technical work to do to ensure full imple-
mentation of obligations and/or exercise of rights. While not
exciting to many, the notification exercise, vetting of laws and
regulations, and other regular business of the committees is of
great importance for the trading system and the securing of all
benefits negotiated. Where Member nations are having trouble
complying with notification requirements, technical assistance
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should be provided either from the WTO or from individual
Members. No major problems have been identified that would
warrant a re-examination of the agreements themselves at the
present time.
Finally, the trading system has an opportunity to increase
likely future liberalization by addressing several areas, either as
part of the built-in agenda (rules for perishable agriculture), as
part of a new round or otherwise (structural excess capacity)
that are not presently adequately addressed.
Where rules do not address the market realities in ways that
Member nations can accept, the result is an inevitable balking at
the pace of liberalization and the search for ad hoc solutions to
address pressing needs. The W'TO, and GATT before it, have
recognized the need to have a solid rules-based system for ex-
panding trade liberalization. As we stand at the front end of the
21st century, it is critical that the WIO strengthen its rules and
reaffirm the important role rules play in encouraging the fur-
therance of trade liberalization.
2000]
724 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:652




OPPORTUNITIES IN THE WTO2000]
Z
z
0U.
2
